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Abstract
SAFE is a clean-slate design for a highly secure computer system, with pervasive mechanisms for track-
ing and limiting information flows. At the lowest level, the SAFE hardware supports fine-grained pro-
grammable tags, with efficient and flexible propagation and combination of tags as instructions are ex-
ecuted. The operating system virtualizes these generic facilities to present an information-flow abstract
machine that allows user programs to label sensitive data with rich confidentiality policies. We present a
formal, machine-checked model of the key hardware and software mechanisms used to dynamically control
information flow in SAFE and an end-to-end proof of noninterference for this model.
We use a refinement proof methodology to propagate the noninterference property of the abstract ma-
chine down to the concrete machine level. We use an intermediate layer in the refinement chain that fac-
tors out the details of the information-flow control policy and devise a code generator for compiling such
information-flow policies into low-level monitor code. Finally, we verify the correctness of this genera-
tor using a dedicated Hoare logic that abstracts from low-level machine instructions into a reusable set of
verified structured code generators.
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1 Introduction
The SAFE design is motivated by the conviction that the insecurity of present-day computer systems is due
in large part to legacy design decisions left over from an era of scarce hardware resources. The time is ripe
for a complete rethink of the entire system stack with security as the central focus. In particular, designers
should be willing to spend more of the abundant processing power available on today’s chips to improve
security.
A key feature of SAFE is that every piece of data, down to the word level, is annotated with a tag
representing policies that govern its use. While the tagging mechanism is very general [9, 35], one partic-
ularly interesting use of tags is for representing information-flow control (IFC) policies. For example, an
individual record might be tagged “This information should only be seen by principals Alice or Bob,” a
function pointer might be tagged “This code is trusted to work with Carol’s secrets,” or a string might be
tagged “This came from the network and has not been sanitized yet.” Such tags representing IFC policies
can involve arbitrary sets of principals, and principals themselves can be dynamically allocated to represent
an unbounded number of entities within and outside the system.
At the programming-language level, rich IFC policies have been extensively explored, with many pro-
posed designs for static [43, 67, 68, 73, 77, 96] and dynamic [4, 5, 6, 7, 40, 44, 72, 75, 78, 86] enforcement
mechanisms and a huge literature on their formal properties [43, 77, etc.]. Similarly, operating systems with
information-flow tracking have been a staple of the OS literature for over a decade [36, 54, 55, 66, 97, 97].
But progress at the hardware level has been more limited, with most proposals concentrating on hardware
acceleration for taint-tracking schemes [18, 25, 26, 31, 32, 89, 92]. SAFE extends the state of the art in
two significant ways. First, the SAFE machine offers hardware support for sound and efficient purely-
dynamic tracking of both explicit and implicit flows (i.e., information leaks through both data and control
flow) for arbitrary machine code programs—not just programs accepted by static analysis, or produced
by translation or transformation. Moreover, rather than using just a few “taint bits,” SAFE associates a
word-sized tag to every word of data in the machine—both memory and registers. In particular, SAFE tags
can be pointers to arbitrary data structures in memory. The interpretation of these tags is left entirely to
software: the hardware just propagates tags from operands to results as each instruction is executed, fol-
lowing software-defined rules. Second, the SAFE design has been informed from the start by an intensive
effort to formalize critical properties of its key mechanisms and produce machine-checked proofs, in par-
allel with the design and implementation of its hardware and system software. Though some prior work
(surveyed in Section 12) shares some of these aims, to the best of our knowledge no project has attempted
this combination of innovations.
Abstractly, the tag propagation rules in SAFE can be viewed as a partial function from argument tuples
of the form (opcode, pc tag, argument1 tag, argument2 tag, . . . ) to result tuples of the form (new pc tag,
result tag), meaning “if the next instruction to be executed is opcode, the current tag of the program counter
(PC) is pc tag, and the arguments expected by this opcode are tagged argument1 tag, etc., then executing
the instruction is allowed and, in the new state of the machine, the PC should be tagged new pc tag and
any new data created by the instruction should be tagged result tag.” (The individual argument-result pairs
in this function’s graph are called rule instances, to distinguish them from the symbolic rules used at the
software level.) In general, the graph of this function in extenso will be huge; so, concretely, the hardware
maintains a cache of recently-used rule instances. On each instruction dispatch (in parallel with the logic
implementing the usual behavior of the instruction—e.g., addition), the hardware forms an argument tuple
as described above and looks it up in the rule cache. If the lookup is successful, the result tuple includes a
new tag for the PC and a tag for the result of the instruction (if any); these are combined with the ordinary
results of instruction execution to yield the next machine state. Otherwise, if the lookup is unsuccessful,
the hardware invokes a cache fault handler—a trusted piece of system software with the job of checking
whether the faulting combination of tags corresponds to a policy violation or whether it should be allowed.
In the latter case, an appropriate rule instance specifying tags for the instruction’s results is added to the
cache, and the faulting instruction is restarted. Thus, the hardware is generic and the interpretation of
policies (e.g., IFC, memory safety or control flow integrity [9, 35]) is programmed in software, with the
results cached in hardware for common-case efficiency.
The first contribution of this paper is to explain and formalize, in the Coq proof assistant [90], the key
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ideas in this design via a simplified model of the SAFE machine, embodying its tagging mechanisms in
a distilled form and focusing on enforcing IFC using these general mechanisms. In Section 2, we outline
the features of the full SAFE system and enumerate the most significant simplifications in our model. In
Section 3, we present the high-level programming interface of our model, embodied by an abstract IFC
machine with a built-in, purely dynamic IFC enforcement mechanism and an abstract lattice of IFC labels.
We then show, in three steps, how this abstract machine can be implemented using the low-level mechanisms
we propose. The first step introduces a symbolic IFC rule machine that reorganizes the semantics of the
abstract machine, splitting out the IFC enforcement mechanism into a separate judgment parameterized by
a symbolic IFC rule table (Section 4). The second step defines a generic concrete machine (Section 5) that
provides low-level support for efficiently implementing many different high-level policies (IFC and others)
with a combination of a hardware rule cache and a software fault handler. The final step instantiates
the concrete machine with a concrete fault handler enforcing IFC. We do this using an IFC fault handler
generator (Section 6), which compiles the symbolic IFC rule table into a sequence of machine instructions
implementing the IFC enforcement judgment.
Our second contribution is a machine-checked proof that this simplified SAFE system is correct and
secure, in the sense that user code running on the concrete machine equipped with the IFC fault handler
behaves the same way as on the abstract machine and enjoys the standard noninterference property that
“high inputs do not influence low outputs.” The interplay of the concrete machine and fault handler is
complex, so some proof abstraction is essential. (Previous projects such as the CompCert compiler [57],
the seL4 [53, 66] and CertiKOS [39, 82] microkernels, and the RockSalt SFI checker [64] have demon-
strated the need for significant attention to organization in similar proofs.) In our proof architecture, a first
abstraction layer is based on refinement. This allows us to reason in terms of a high-level view of mem-
ory, ignoring the concrete implementation of IFC labels, while setting up the intricate indistinguishability
relation used in the noninterference proof. A second layer of abstraction is required for reasoning about the
correctness of the fault handler. Here, we rely on a verified custom Hoare logic that abstracts from low-level
machine instructions into a reusable set of verified structured code generators.
In Section 7 we prove that the IFC fault handler generator correctly compiles a symbolic IFC rule
table and a concrete representation of an abstract label lattice into an appropriate sequence of machine
instructions. We then introduce a standard notion of refinement (Section 8) and show that the concrete
machine running the generated IFC fault handler refines the abstract IFC machine and vice-versa, using the
symbolic IFC rule machine as an intermediate refinement point in each direction of the proof (Section 9).
In our deterministic setting, showing refinement in both directions guarantees that the concrete machine
does not diverge or get stuck when handling a fault. We next introduce a standard termination-insensitive
noninterference (TINI) property (Section 10) and show that it holds for the abstract machine. Since deter-
ministic TINI is preserved by refinement, we conclude that the concrete machine running the generated IFC
fault handler also satisfies TINI. In Section 11, we explain how the programming model and formal de-
velopment of the first sections can be extended to accommodate two important features: dynamic memory
allocation and tags representing sets of principals. This extension, carried out after the development of the
basic model, gives us confidence in the robustness of our methodology. We close with a survey of related
work (Section 12) and a discussion of future directions (Section 13). Our Coq formalization is available at
https://github.com/micro-policies/verified-ifc.
A preliminary abridged version of this work appeared in the proceedings of the POPL 2014 confer-
ence [8]. This extended and improved version includes:
• more examples and clarifying explanations in the formal sections;
• a more detailed technical description of the formalization: the semantics of the abstract, symbolic
and concrete machines, the language for expressing symbolic IFC rules, our verified structured code
generators, and TINI-preserving refinements;
• more details of the proofs;
• a more extensive discussion of related work, including more recent work on transplanting the tagging
mechanism of SAFE onto a mainstream RISC processor [30] and using it to enforce properties beyond
IFC [9, 35].
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2 Overview of SAFE
To establish context, we begin with a brief overview of the full SAFE system, concentrating on its OS- and
hardware-level features. More detailed descriptions can be found elsewhere [29, 33, 34, 35, 45, 46, 56, 62].
SAFE’s system software performs process scheduling, stream-based interprocess communication, storage
allocation and garbage collection, and management of the low-level tagging hardware (the focus of this
paper). The goal is to organize these services as a collection of mutually suspicious compartments following
the principle of least privilege (a zero-kernel OS [84]), so that an attacker would need to compromise
multiple compartments to gain complete control of the machine. It is programmed in a combination of
assembly and Tempest, a new low-level systems programming language.
The SAFE hardware integrates a number of mechanisms for eliminating common vulnerabilities and
supporting higher-level security primitives. To begin with, SAFE is (dynamically) typed at the hardware
level: each data word is indelibly marked as a number, an instruction, a pointer, etc. Next, the hardware
is memory safe: every pointer consists of a triple of base, bounds, and offset (compactly encoded into 64
bits [34, 56]), and every pointer operation includes a hardware bounds check [56]. Finally, the hardware
associates each word in the registers and memory, as well as the PC, with a large (59-bit) tag. The hardware
rule cache, enabling software-specified propagation of tags from operands to result on each machine step, is
implemented using a combination of multiple hash functions to approximate a fully-associative cache [33].
An unusual feature of the SAFE design is that formal modeling and verification of its core mechanisms
have played a central role in the design process since the beginning. The original goal—formally specify-
ing and verifying the entire set of critical runtime services—proved to be too ambitious, but key security
properties of simplified models have been verified both at the level of Breeze [45] (a mostly functional,
security-oriented, dynamic language used for user-level programming on SAFE) and, in the present work,
at the hardware and abstract machine level. We also used random testing of properties like noninterference
as a means to speed the design process [46].
Our goal in this paper is to develop a clear, precise, and mathematically tractable model of one of the
main innovations in the SAFE design: its scheme for efficiently supporting high-level data use policies
using a combination of hardware and low-level system software. To make the model easy to work with,
we simplify away many important facets of the real SAFE system. In particular, (i) we focus only on IFC
and noninterference, although the tagging facilities of the SAFE machine are generic and can be applied
to other policies (more recent work illustrates this point [8, 35]; we return to it at the end of Section 12);
(ii) we ignore the Breeze and Tempest programming languages and concentrate on the hardware and run-
time services; (iii) we use a stack instead of registers, and we distill the instruction set to just a handful of
opcodes; (iv) we drop SAFE’s fine-grained privilege separation in favor of a more conventional user-mode
/ kernel-mode dichotomy; (v) we shrink the rule cache to a single entry (avoiding issues of replacement and
eviction) and maintain it in kernel memory, accessed by ordinary loads and stores, rather than in specialized
cache hardware; (vi) we focus on termination-insensitive noninterference and omit a large number of more
advanced IFC-related concepts that are supported by the real SAFE system (dynamic principals, down-
grading, public labels, integrity, clearance, etc.); (vii) we handle exceptional conditions, including potential
security violations, by simply halting the whole machine; and (viii) most importantly, we ignore concur-
rency, process scheduling, and interprocess communication, assuming instead that the whole machine has a
single, deterministic thread of control. We believe that most of these restrictions can be lifted without funda-
mentally changing the structure of the model or of the proofs. For instance, recent follow-on work by some
of the authors [47] discusses a mechanized proof of noninterference for a similar abstract machine featuring
registers and a richer IFC policy. The absence of concurrency is a particularly significant simplification,
given that we are talking about an operating system that offers IFC as a service. However, we conjecture
that it may be possible to add concurrency to our formalization, while maintaining a high degree of deter-
minism, by adapting the approach used in the proof of noninterference for the seL4 microkernel [65, 66].
We return to this point in Section 13.
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instr ::= Basic instruction set
| Add addition
| Output output top of stack
| Pushn push integer constant
| Load indirect load from data memory
| Store indirect store to data memory
| Jump unconditional indirect jump
| Bnzn conditional relative jump
| Call indirect call
| Ret return
Figure 1: Instruction set
3 Abstract IFC Machine
We begin the technical development by defining a very simple stack-and-pointer machine with “hard-wired”
dynamic IFC. This machine concisely embodies the IFC mechanism we want to provide to higher-level
software and serves as a specification for the symbolic IFC rule machine (Section 4) and for the concrete
machine (Section 5) running our IFC fault handler (Section 6). The three machines share a tiny instruction
set (Figure 1) designed to be a convenient target for compiling the symbolic IFC rule table into machine
instructions (the Coq development formalizes several other instructions, including Sub, Pop, a variant of
Call that takes a variable number of arguments and a variant of Ret that allows returning a result on the
stack). All three machines use a fixed instruction memory ι, a partial function from (non-negative) integer
addresses to instructions.
The machine manipulates integers (ranged over by n , m , and p); unlike the real SAFE machine, we
make no distinction between raw integers and pointers (we re-introduce this distinction in Section 11).
Each integer is marked with an individual IFC label (ranged over by L) that denotes its security level. We
call a pair of an integer n and its corresponding label L an atom, written n@L and ranged over by a . We
assume that IFC labels L form a set L equipped with a partial order (≤), a least upper bound operation
(∨), and a bottom element (⊥), but do not place further requirements on them. This generality allows us to
model many different kinds of labels present in existing IFC systems [62]. For instance we might take L to
be the set of levels {⊥,>} with ⊥ ≤ > and ⊥ ∨ > = >. Alternatively, we could consider a richer set of
labels, such as finite sets of principals ordered by set inclusion, as discussed in Section 11.
An abstract machine state 〈µ [σ] pc〉 consists of a data memory µ, a stack σ, and a program counter pc.
(We sometimes drop the outer brackets.) The data memory µ is a partial function from integer addresses to
atoms. We write µ(p) ← a for the memory that coincides with µ everywhere except at p, where its value
is a. The stack σ is essentially a list of atoms, but we distinguish stacks beginning with return addresses
(written pc;σ) from ones beginning with regular atoms (written a, σ). Formally, stacks are lists with two
“cons” constructors, written “,” and “;”. This distinction is needed so that stack-manipulating instructions
treat frame markers specially; for example, a program that Pushes an integer and then attempts to return
to it is treated as erroneous by the operational semantics. The program counter (PC) pc is an atom whose
label is used to track implicit flows, as explained below.
The step relation of the abstract machine, written ι ` µ1 [σ1] pc1 α−→ µ2 [σ2] pc2, is a partial function
taking a machine state to a machine state plus an output action α, which can be either an atom or the silent
action τ . We generally omit the instruction memory ι from transitions because it is fixed. Throughout the
paper we consistently refer to non-silent actions as events (ranged over by e).
The stepping rules in Figure 2 adapt a standard purely dynamic IFC enforcement mechanism [4, 75] to
a low-level machine, following recent work by Hrit¸cu et al. [46]. (Readers less familiar with the intricacies
of dynamic IFC may find some of these side conditions a bit mysterious. A longer explanation can be found
in [46], but the details are not critical for present purposes.) The rule for Add joins (∨) the labels of the
two operands to produce the label of the result, which ensures that the result is at least as classified as each
of the operands. For example, suppose ι = [...,Add, ...] and n is the index of this Add instruction. Then
µ [7@⊥, 5@>] n@⊥ τ−→ µ [12@>] (n+1)@⊥. The rule for Push labels the integer constant added to the
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ι(n) = Add
µ [n1@L1,n2@L2, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→
µ [(n1+n2)@(L1∨L2), σ] (n+1)@Lpc
ι(n) = Pushm
µ [σ] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ [m@⊥, σ] (n+1)@Lpc
ι(n) = Load µ(p) = m@L2
µ [p@L1, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→
µ [m@(L1∨L2), σ] (n+1)@Lpc
ι(n) = Store µ(p) = k@L3
L1∨Lpc ≤ L3 µ(p)← (m@L1∨L2∨Lpc) = µ′
µ [p@L1,m@L2, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→
µ′ [σ] (n+1)@Lpc
ι(n) = Jump
µ [n ′@L1, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ [σ] n ′@(L1∨Lpc)
ι(n) = Bnz k n ′ = n+((m = 0)?1 : k)
µ [m@L1, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ [σ] n ′@(L1∨Lpc)
ι(n) = Call
µ [n ′@L1, a, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→
µ [a, (n+1)@Lpc;σ] n
′
@(L1∨Lpc)
ι(n) = Ret
µ [n ′@L1;σ] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ [σ] n ′@L1
ι(n) = Output
µ [m@L1, σ] n@Lpc
m@(L1∨Lpc)−−−−−−−−→
µ [σ] (n+1)@Lpc
Figure 2: Semantics of abstract IFC machine
stack as public (⊥). The rule for Jump uses join to raise the label of the PC by the label of the target address
of the jump. Similarly, Bnz raises the label of the PC by the label of the tested integer. In both cases the
value of the PC after the instruction depends on data that could be secret, and we use the label of the PC to
track the label of data that has influenced control flow. In order to prevent implicit flows (leaks exploiting
the control flow of the program), the Store rule joins the PC label with the original label of the written
integer and with the label of the pointer through which the write happens. Additionally, since the labels
of memory locations are allowed to vary during execution, we prevent leaking information via labels using
a “no-sensitive-upgrade” check [4, 96] (the ≤ precondition in the rule for Store).1 This check prevents
memory locations labeled public from being overwritten when either the PC or the pointer through which
the store happens has been influenced by secrets. The Output rule labels the emitted integer with the join
of its original label and the current PC label.2 Finally, because of the structured control flow imposed by
the stack discipline, the rule for Ret can soundly restore the PC label to whatever it was at the time of the
Call. This feature allows programmers to avoid label creep—i.e., having the current PC label inadvertently
go up when branching on secrets unknowingly—by making judicious use of Call and Ret, but may require
careful thought to be used correctly. Many other solutions have been proposed to this problem, each with
their own strengths and weaknesses. Some systems, such as LIO [87], prevent label creep by maintaining a
clearance level that serves as an upper bound on the PC label; this, however, may lead to dynamic errors if
a computation tries to inspect a secret above its clearance.
All data in the machine’s state are labelled, and this simple machine manages labels to ensure nonin-
1 More recent work further improves precision compared to the no-sensitive-upgrades policy [5, 15, 44, 46]. We adopted no-
sensitive-upgrades in this work because it is simpler and requires less bookkeeping.
2We assume the observer of the events generated by Output is constrained by the rules of information flow—i.e., cannot freely
“look inside” bare events. In the real SAFE machine, atoms being sent to the outside world need to be protected cryptographically;
we are abstracting this away.
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terference as defined and proved in Section 10. There are no instructions that dynamically raise the label
(classification) of an atom. Such an instruction, joinP, is added to the machine in Section 11.
4 Symbolic IFC Rule Machine
In the abstract machine described above, IFC is tightly integrated into the step relation in the form of side
conditions on each instruction. In contrast, the concrete machine (i.e., the “hardware”) described in Sec-
tion 5 is generic, designed to support a wide range of software-defined policies (IFC and other). The
machine introduced in this section serves as a bridge between these two models. It is closer to the abstract
machine—indeed, its machine states and the behavior of the step relation are identical. The important
difference lies in the definition of the step relation, where all the IFC-related aspects are factored out into
a separate judgment. We can think of the IFC mechanism as being implemented in a separate “IFC rule
processor” distinct from the main “CPU.” In the concrete machine, the CPU part will remain unchanged,
but the IFC rule processor will be implemented mostly in software (by the fault handler), with the hardware
only providing caching of rule instances. While factoring out IFC enforcement into a separate reference
monitor [80] is commonplace [1, 75, 78], our approach goes further. We define a small DSL for describing
symbolic IFC rules and obtain actual monitors by interpreting this DSL (in this section) and by compiling
it into machine instructions using verified structured code generators (in Section 6 and Section 7). This
architecture makes it easier to implement other IFC mechanisms (e.g., permissive upgrades [5]), beyond
the simple one in Section 3. Since the DSL compilation is verified, we prove that the concrete machine
of Section 5 is noninterfering when given any correct monitor written in the DSL. Showing that a moni-
tor is correct, on the other hand, involves a simple refinement proof (Lemma 9.2), and a noninterference
proof for the abstract machine (Theorem 10.5), but is independent of the code generation infrastructure and
corresponding proofs.
More formally, each stepping rule of the new machine (see Figure 3) includes a uniform call to an IFC
enforcement relation, which itself is parameterized by a symbolic IFC rule table R. Given the labels of
the values relevant to an instruction, the IFC enforcement relation (i) checks whether the execution of that
instruction is allowed in the current configuration, and (ii) if so, yields the labels to put on the resulting
PC and on any resulting value. This judgment has the form `R (Lpc, `1, `2, `3) ;op Lrpc, Lr, where the
4-tuple on the left-hand side represents the input PC label and three additional input labels (more precisely,
optional labels, as the number of relevant labels depends on the opcode but the tuple is of fixed size), op is
an opcode, and Lrpc and Lr are the resulting output labels (of which the second might be ignored).
Let us illustrate, for a few cases, how this new judgment is used in the stepping relation (Figure 3). The
stepping rule for Add passes three inputs to the IFC enforcement judgment: Lpc, the label of the current
PC, and L1 and L2, the labels of the two operands at the top of the stack. (The fourth element of the input
tuple is written as because it is not needed for Add.) The IFC enforcement judgment produces two labels:
Lrpc is used to label the next program counter (n+ 1) and Lr is used to label the result value. All the other
stepping rules follow a similar scheme. (The one for Store uses all four input labels. In this stepping rule
the resulting label Lr is used to label the new value m to be stored at location p.)
A symbolic IFC rule tableR describes a particular IFC enforcement mechanism. For instance, the rule
table Rabs corresponding to the IFC mechanism of the abstract machine is shown in Figure 4. In general,
a table R associates a symbolic IFC rule to each instruction opcode (formally, R is a total function). Each
of these rules is formed of three symbolic expressions: (i) a boolean expression indicating whether the
execution of the instruction is allowed or not (i.e., whether it violates the IFC enforcement mechanism);
(ii) a label-valued expression for Lrpc, the label of the next PC; and (iii) a label-valued expression for Lr,
the label of the result value, if there is one. In cases where Lr is not used by the corresponding opcode, we
write __ to mean “don’t care,” which is a synonym for BOT (the symbolic representation of the ⊥ label).
These symbolic expressions are written in a simple domain-specific language (DSL) of operations over
an IFC lattice. The grammar of this DSL (Figure 5) includes label variables LABpc , . . . , LAB3, which cor-
respond to the input labels Lpc, . . . ,L3; the constant BOT; and the lattice operators unionsq (join) and v (flows).
The IFC enforcement judgment looks up the corresponding symbolic IFC rule in the table and directly
evaluates the symbolic expressions in terms of the corresponding lattice operations. In contrast, in Sec-
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ι(n) = Add
`R (Lpc,L1,L2, );add Lrpc, Lr
µ [n1@L1,n2@L2, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→
µ [(n1+n2)@Lr, σ] (n+1)@Lrpc
ι(n) = Pushm
`R (Lpc, , , );push Lrpc, Lr
µ [σ] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ [m@Lr, σ] (n+1)@Lrpc
ι(n) = Load µ(p) = m@L2
`R (Lpc,L1,L2, );load Lrpc, Lr
µ [p@L1, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→
µ [m@Lr, σ] (n+1)@Lrpc
ι(n) = Store µ(p) = k@L3
`R (Lpc,L1,L2,L3);store Lrpc, Lr
µ(p)← m@Lr = µ′
µ [p@L1,m@L2, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ′ [σ] (n+1)@Lrpc
ι(n) = Jump
`R (Lpc,L1, , );jump Lrpc,
µ [n ′@L1, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ [σ] n ′@Lrpc
ι(n) = Bnz k n ′ = n+((m = 0)?1 : k)
`R (Lpc,L1, , );bnz Lrpc,
µ [m@L1, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ [σ] n ′@Lrpc
ι(n) = Call
`R (Lpc,L1, , );call Lrpc, Lr
µ [n ′@L1, a, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→
µ [a, (n+1)@Lr;σ] n
′
@Lrpc
ι(n) = Ret `R (Lpc,L1, , );ret Lrpc,
µ [n ′@L1;σ] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ [σ] n ′@Lrpc
ι(n) = Output
`R (Lpc,L1, , );output Lrpc, Lr
µ [m@L1, σ] n@Lpc
m@Lr−−−−→
µ [σ] (n+1)@Lrpc
Figure 3: Semantics of symbolic rule machine, parameterized byR
opcode allow erpc er
add TRUE LABpc LAB1 unionsq LAB2
output TRUE LABpc LAB1 unionsq LABpc
push TRUE LABpc BOT
load TRUE LABpc LAB1 unionsq LAB2
store LAB1unionsq LABpc v LAB3 LABpc LAB1 unionsq LAB2 unionsq LABpc
jump TRUE LAB1 unionsq LABpc __
bnz TRUE LAB1 unionsq LABpc __
call TRUE LAB1 unionsq LABpc LABpc
ret TRUE LAB1 __
Figure 4: Rule tableRabs corresponding to abstract IFC machine
tion 6 we compile this rule table into the IFC fault handler for the concrete machine. Formally, the IFC
enforcement judgment is defined by the two following cases, depending on whether the second output label
is relevant or not:
RuleR(op) = 〈allow , erpc, er〉
ρ ` allow ρ ` erpc ↓ Lrpc ρ ` er ↓ Lr
`R ρ;op Lrpc, Lr
RuleR(op) = 〈allow , erpc, __〉
ρ ` allow ρ ` erpc ↓ Lrpc
`R ρ;op Lrpc,
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LE , er, erpc ::=
| BOT
| LAB1
| LAB2
| LAB3
| LABpc
| LE1 unionsq LE2
| __
| (LE )
BE , allow ::=
| TRUE
| LE1 v LE2
| AND BE1 BE2
| OR BE1 BE2
| (BE )
Figure 5: Symbolic IFC rule language syntax
ρ ` TRUE
ρ ` LE1 ↓ L1 ρ ` LE2 ↓ L2 L1 ≤ L2
ρ ` LE1 v LE2
ρ ` BE1 ρ ` BE2
ρ ` AND BE1 BE2
ρ ` BE1
ρ ` OR BE1 BE2
ρ ` BE2
ρ ` OR BE1 BE2 ρ ` BOT ↓ ⊥
ρ ` LE1 ↓ L1 ρ ` LE2 ↓ L2
ρ ` (LE1 unionsq LE2) ↓ (L1∨L2)
(Lpc, `1, `2, `3) ` LABpc ↓ Lpc (Lpc, `1,L2, `3) ` LAB2 ↓ L2
(Lpc,L1, `2, `3) ` LAB1 ↓ L1 (Lpc, `1, `2,L3) ` LAB3 ↓ L3
Figure 6: Symbolic IFC rule language semantics
Here ρ is a 4-tuple of labels, RuleR looks up the relevant opcode in rule table R, and the expression
evaluation judgment ρ ` . . . is defined in Figure 6.
5 Concrete Machine
The concrete machine provides low-level support for efficiently implementing many different high-level
policies (IFC and others) with a combination of a hardware rule cache and a software cache fault handler.
In this section we focus on the concrete machine’s hardware, which is completely generic, while in Section 6
we describe a specific fault handler corresponding to the IFC rules of the symbolic rule machine.
The concrete machine has the same general structure as the more abstract ones, but differs in several
important respects. One is that it annotates data values with integer tags T, rather than with labels L from an
abstract lattice; thus, the concrete atoms a in the data memories and the stack have the form n@T. Similarly,
a concrete action α is either a concrete atom or the silent action τ . We consistently use the word label and
variable L to refer to the (abstract, lattice-structured) labels of the abstract and symbolic rule machines and
the word tag and variable T for concrete integers representing labels. Using plain integers as tags allows us
to delegate their interpretation entirely to software. In this paper we focus solely on using tags to implement
IFC labels, although they could also be used for enforcing other policies, such as type and memory safety
or control-flow integrity [9, 35]. For instance, to implement the two-point abstract lattice with ⊥ ≤ >,
we could use 0 to represent ⊥ and 1 to represent >, making the operations ∨ and ≤ easy to implement
(see Section 6). For richer abstract lattices, a more complex concrete representation might be needed; for
example, a label containing an arbitrary set of principals might be represented concretely by a pointer to an
array data structure (see Section 11). In places where a tag is needed but its value is irrelevant, the concrete
machine uses a specific but arbitrary default tag value (e.g., -1), which we write TD.
A second important difference is that the concrete machine has two modes: user mode (u), for executing
the ordinary user program, and kernel mode (k), for handling rule cache faults. To support these two modes,
the concrete machine’s state contains a privilege bit pi, a separate kernel instruction memory φ, and a
separate kernel data memory κ, in addition to the user instruction memory ι, the user data memory µ,
the stack σ, and the PC. When the machine is operating in user mode (pi = u), instructions are looked
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up using the PC as an index into ι, and loads and stores use µ; when in kernel mode (pi = k), the PC
is treated as an index into φ, and loads and stores use κ. The concrete step relation has the form ι, φ `
pi1 κ1 µ1 [σ1] pc1
α−→ pi2 κ2 µ2 [σ2] pc2. As before, since ι and φ are fixed, we normally leave them
implicit when writing down machine transitions.
The concrete machine has the same instruction set as the previous ones, allowing user programs to
be run on all three machines unchanged. But the tag-related semantics of instructions depends on the
privilege mode, and in user mode the semantics further depends on the state of the rule cache. In the real
SAFE machine, the rule cache may contain thousands of entries and is implemented as a separate near-
associative memory [33] accessed by special instructions. Here, for simplicity, we use a cache with just
one entry, located at the start of kernel memory, and use Load and Store instructions to manipulate it.
When implementing simple IFC labels such as the two-point lattice defined above, the rule cache is all that
needs to live in κ. More complex label models, on the other hand, such as those of Section 11, may require
additional memory to store internal data structures.
The rule cache holds a single rule instance, represented graphically like this:
opcode Tpc T1 T2 T3 Trpc Tr
Location 0 holds an integer representing an opcode. (Since the exact choice of representation doesn’t
matter, we will denote each opcode with a lowercase identifier—for example, we might define add = 0,
output = 1, etc.) Location 1 holds the PC tag. Locations 2 to 4 hold the tags of any other arguments needed
by this particular opcode. Location 5 holds the tag that should go on the PC after this instruction executes,
and location 6 holds the tag for the instruction’s result value, if needed. For example, suppose the cache
contains this:
add 0 1 1 -1 0 1
(Note that we are showing just the “payload” part of these seven atoms; by convention, the tag part is always
TD, and we do not display it.) This one-line rule cache should be thought of as implementing a (very) partial
function: when the input is add 0 1 1 -1 , the output is 0 1 ; otherwise it is undefined. If 0 is the
tag representing the label ⊥, 1 represents >, and -1 is the default tag TD, this can be interpreted abstractly
as follows: “If the next instruction is Add, the PC is labeled ⊥, and the two relevant arguments are both
labeled>, then the instruction should be allowed, the label on the new PC should be⊥, and the label on the
result of the operation is >.”
There are two sets of stepping rules governing the behavior of the concrete machine in user mode; which
set applies depends on whether the current machine state matches the current contents of the rule cache. In
the “cache hit” case (Figure 7), the instruction executes normally, with the cache’s output determining the
new PC tag and result tag (if any).
In the “cache miss” case (Figure 8), the relevant parts of the current state (opcode, PC tag, argument
tags) are stored into the input part of the single cache line and the machine simulates a Call to the fault
handler.
To see how this works in more detail, consider the two user-mode stepping rules for the Add instruction.
ι(n) = Add
κ = add Tpc T1 T2 TD Trpc Tr
u κ µ [n1@T1,n2@T2, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
u κ µ [(n1+n2)@Tr, σ] n+1@Trpc
ι(n) = Add
κi 6= add Tpc T1 T2 TD = κj
u [κi, κo] µ [n1@T1,n2@T2, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
k [κj , κD] µ [(n@Tpc,u);n1@T1,n2@T2, σ] 0@TD
In the first rule (cache hit), the side condition demands that the input part of the current cache contents have
the form add Tpc T1 T2 TD , where Tpc is the tag on the current PC, T1 and T2 are the tags on the top
two atoms on the stack, and the fourth element is the default tag. In this case, the output part of the rule,
Trpc Tr , determines the tag Trpc on the PC and the tag Tr on the new atom pushed onto the stack in the
next machine state.
In the second rule (cache miss), the notation [κi, κo] means “let κi be the input part of the current rule
cache and κo be the output part.” The side condition says that the current input part κi does not have the
desired form add Tpc T1 T2 TD , so the machine needs to enter the fault handler. The next machine state
is formed as follows: (i) the input part of the cache is set to the desired form κj and the output part is set
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ι(n) = Add
κ = add Tpc T1 T2 TD Trpc Tr
u κ µ [n1@T1,n2@T2, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
u κ µ [(n1+n2)@Tr, σ] n+1@Trpc
ι(n) = Pushm
κ = push Tpc TD TD TD Trpc Tr
u κ µ [σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
u κ µ [m@Tr, σ] n+1@Trpc
ι(n) = Load µ(p) = m@T2
κ = load Tpc T1 T2 TD Trpc Tr
u κ µ [p@T1, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
u κ µ [m@Tr, σ] n+1@Trpc
ι(n) = Store µ(p) = k@T3
κ = store Tpc T1 T2 T3 Trpc Tr
µ(p)← (m@Tr) = µ′
u κ µ [p@T1,m@T2, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
u κ µ′ [σ] n+1@Trpc
ι(n) = Jump
κ = jump Tpc T1 TD TD Trpc TD
u κ µ [n ′@T1, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
u κ µ [σ] n ′@Trpc
ι(n) = Bnz k
κ = bnz Tpc T1 TD TD Trpc TD
n ′ = n+((m = 0)?1 : k)
u κ µ [m@T1, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
u κ µ [σ] n ′@Trpc
ι(n) = Call
κ = call Tpc T1 TD TD Trpc Tr
u κ µ [n ′@T1, a, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
u κ µ [a, (n+1@Tr,u);σ] n ′@Trpc
ι(n) = Ret
κ = ret Tpc T1 TD TD Trpc TD
u κ µ [(n ′@T1,u);σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
u κ µ [σ] n ′@Trpc
ι(n) = Output
κ = output Tpc T1 TD TD Trpc Tr
u κ µ [m@T1, σ] n@Tpc
m@Tr−−−−→
u κ µ [σ] n+1@Trpc
Figure 7: Concrete step relation: user mode, cache hit case
to κD , TD TD ; (ii) a new return frame is pushed on top of the stack to remember the current PC and
privilege bit (u); (iii) the privilege bit is set to k (which will cause the next instruction to be read from the
kernel instruction memory); and (iv) the PC is set to 0, the location in the kernel instruction memory where
the fault handler routine begins.
What happens next is up to the fault handler code. Its job is to examine the contents of the first five
kernel memory locations and either (i) write appropriate tags for the result and new PC into the sixth and
seventh kernel memory locations and then perform a Ret to go back to user mode and restart the faulting
instruction, or (ii) stop the machine by jumping to an invalid PC (-1) to signal that the attempted combination
of opcode and argument tags is illegal.3 This mechanism is general and can be used to implement many
different high-level policies (IFC and others).
In kernel mode (Figure 9), the treatment of tags is almost completely degenerate: to avoid infinite
regress, the concrete machine does not consult the rule cache while in kernel mode. For most instructions,
tags read from the current machine state are ignored (indicated by ) and tags written to the new state are
3As explained in Section 2, in this work we assume for simplicity that policy violations are fatal. Recent work [45] has shown that
it is possible to recover from IFC violations while preserving noninterference.
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ι(n) = Add
κi 6= add Tpc T1 T2 TD = κj
u [κi, κo] µ [n1@T1,n2@T2, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
k [κj , κD] µ [(n@Tpc,u);n1@T1,n2@T2, σ] 0@TD
ι(n) = Pushm
κi 6= push Tpc TD TD TD = κj
u [κi, κo] µ [σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
k [κj , κD] µ [(n@Tpc,u);σ] 0@TD
ι(n) = Load µ(p) = m@T2
κi 6= load Tpc T1 T2 TD = κj
u [κi, κo] µ [p@T1, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
k [κj , κD] µ [(n@Tpc,u); p@T1, σ] 0@TD
ι(n) = Store µ(p) = k@T3
κi 6= store Tpc T1 T2 T3 = κj
u [κi, κo] µ [p@T1,m@T2, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
k [κj , κD] µ [(n@Tpc,u); p@T1,m@T2, σ] 0@TD
ι(n) = Jump
κi 6= jump Tpc T1 TD TD = κj
u [κi, κo] µ [n ′@T1, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
k [κj , κD] µ [(n@Tpc,u);n ′@T1, σ] 0@TD
ι(n) = Bnz k
κi 6= bnz Tpc T1 TD TD = κj
u [κi, κo] µ [m@T1, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
k [κj , κD] µ [(n@Tpc,u);m@T1, σ] 0@TD
ι(n) = Call
κi 6= call Tpc T1 TD TD = κj
u [κi, κo] µ [n ′@T1, a, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
k [κj , κD] µ [(n@Tpc,u);n ′@T1, a, σ] 0@TD
ι(n) = Ret
κi 6= ret Tpc T1 TD TD = κj
u [κi, κo] µ [(n ′@T1, pi);σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
k [κj , κD] µ [(n@Tpc,u); (n ′@T1, pi);σ] 0@TD
ι(n) = Output
κi 6= output Tpc T1 TD TD = κj
u [κi, κo] µ [m@T1, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
k [κj , κD] µ [(n@Tpc,u);m@T1, σ] 0@TD
Figure 8: Concrete step relation: user mode, cache miss case
set to TD. This can be seen for instance in the kernel-mode step rule for addition
φ(n) = Add
k κ µ [n1@ ,n2@ , σ] n@
τ−→
k κ µ [(n1+n2)@TD, σ] n+1@TD
The only significant exceptions to this pattern are Load and Store, which preserve the tag of the datum
being read from or written to memory, and Ret, which takes both the privilege bit and the new PC (including
its tag!) from the return frame at the top of the stack. This is critical, since a Ret instruction is used to return
from kernel to user mode when the fault handler has finished executing.
φ(n) = Ret
k κ µ [(n ′@T1, pi);σ] n@
τ−→ pi κ µ [σ] n ′@T1
A final point is that Output is not permitted in kernel mode, which guarantees that kernel actions are
always the silent action τ .
As an illustration of how all this works, suppose again that ι = [...,Add, ...], and that the concrete
integer tag 0 represents the abstract label⊥, 1 represents>, and -1 is TD. Then, in a cache-hit configuration,
we have (omitting the silent τ label on transitions):
u add 0 0 1 -1 0 1 µ [7@0, 5@1] n@0 −→
u add 0 0 1 -1 0 1 µ [12@1] (n+1)@0
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φ(n) = Add
k κ µ [n1@ ,n2@ , σ] n@
τ−→
k κ µ [(n1+n2)@TD, σ] n+1@TD
φ(n) = Pushm
k κ µ [σ] n@ τ−→ k κ µ [m@TD, σ] n+1@TD
φ(n) = Load κ(p) = m@T1
k κ µ [p@ , σ] n@ τ−→
k κ µ [m@T1, σ] n+1@TD
φ(n) = Store storeκ p (m@T1) = κ′
k κ µ [p@ ,m@T1, σ] n@
τ−→
k κ′ µ [σ] n+1@TD
φ(n) = Jump
k κ µ [n ′@ , σ] n@ τ−→ k κ µ [σ] n ′@TD
φ(n) = Bnz k n ′ = n+((m = 0)?1 : k)
k κ µ [m@ , σ] n@ τ−→ k κ µ [σ] n ′@TD
φ(n) = Call
k κ µ [n ′@ , a, σ] n@ τ−→
k κ µ [a, (n+1@TD, k);σ] n ′@TD
φ(n) = Ret
k κ µ [(n ′@T1, pi);σ] n@
τ−→ pi κ µ [σ] n ′@T1
Figure 9: Concrete step relation (kernel mode)
On the other hand, if the tags on both operands are 1 (i.e., >), then the first step will miss in the cache and
reduction will proceed as follows:
u add 0 0 1 -1 0 1 µ [7@1, 5@1] n@0 −→ (cache miss)
k add 0 1 1 -1 -1 -1 µ [(n@0,u); 7@1, 5@1] 0@-1 −→ (call fault handler, kernel mode)
... fault handler runs ...
k add 0 1 1 -1 0 1 µ [(n@0,u); 7@1, 5@1] k@-1 −→ (fault handler returns to user mode)
u add 0 1 1 -1 0 1 µ [7@1, 5@1] n@0 −→ (restarts instruction, cache now hits)
u add 0 0 1 -1 0 1 µ [12@1] (n+1)@0
6 Fault Handler for IFC
Now we assemble the pieces. A concrete IFC machine implementing the symbolic rule machine defined in
Section 4 can be obtained by installing appropriate fault handler code in the kernel instruction memory of
the concrete machine presented in Section 5. In essence, this handler must emulate how the symbolic rule
machine looks up and evaluates the DSL expressions in a given IFC rule table. We choose to generate the
handler code by compiling the lookup and DSL evaluation relations directly into machine code. (An alter-
native would be to represent the rule table as abstract syntax in the kernel memory and write an interpreter
in machine code for the DSL, but the compilation approach seems to lead to simpler code and proofs.)
The handler compilation scheme is given in Figure 10. Each gen∗ function generates a list of concrete
machine instructions; the sequence generated by the top-level genFaultHandler is intended to be installed
starting at location 0 in the concrete machine’s kernel instruction memory. The implicit addr∗ parameters
are symbolic names for the locations of the opcode and various tags in the concrete machine’s rule cache, as
described in Section 5. The entire generator is parameterized by an arbitrary rule table R. We make heavy
use of the (obvious) encoding of booleans where false is represented by 0 and true by any non-zero value.
The top-level handler works in three phases. The first phase, genComputeResults, does most of the
work: it consists of a large nested if-then-else chain, built using genIndexedCases, that compares the opcode
of the faulting instruction against each possible opcode and, on a match, executes the code generated for
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the corresponding symbolic IFC rule. The code generated for each symbolic IFC rule (by genApplyRule)
pushes its results onto the stack: a flag indicating whether the instruction is allowed and, if so, the result-PC
and result-value tags. This first phase never writes to memory or transfers control outside the handler; this
makes it fairly easy to prove correct.
The second phase of the top-level handler, genStoreResults, reads the computed results off the stack
and updates the rule cache appropriately. If the result indicates that the instruction is allowed, the result PC
and value tags are written to the cache, and true is pushed on the stack; otherwise, nothing is written to the
cache, and false is pushed on the stack.
The third and final phase of the top-level handler tests the boolean just pushed onto the stack and either
returns to user code (instruction is allowed) or jumps to address -1 (disallowed).
The code for symbolic rule compilation is built by straightforward recursive traversal of the rule DSL
syntax for label-valued expressions (genELab) and boolean-valued expressions (genBool). These func-
tions are (implicitly) parameterized by the definitions of lattice-specific generators genBot, genJoin, and
genFlows. To implement these generators for a particular lattice, we first need to choose how to represent
abstract labels as integer tags, and then determine a sequence of instructions that encodes each operation.
We call such an encoding scheme a concrete lattice. For example, the abstract labels in the two-point lat-
tice can be encoded like booleans, representing ⊥ by 0, > by non-0, and instantiating genBot, genJoin,
and genFlows with code for computing false, disjunction, and implication, respectively. A simple concrete
lattice like this can be formalized as a tuple CL = (Tag, Lab, genBot, genJoin, genFlows), where the en-
coding and decoding functions Lab and Tag satisfy Lab◦Tag = id; to streamline the exposition, we assume
this form of concrete lattice for most of the paper. The more realistic encoding in Section 11 will require a
more complex treatment.
To raise the level of abstraction of the handler code, we make heavy use of structured code generators;
this makes it easier both to understand the code and to prove it correct using a custom Hoare logic that
follows the structure of the generators (see Section 7). For example, the genIf function takes two code
sequences, representing the “then” and “else” branches of a conditional, and generates code to test the top
of the stack and dispatch control appropriately. The higher-order generator genIndexedCases takes a list
of integer indices (e.g., opcodes) and functions for generating guards and branch bodies from an index,
and generates code that will run the guards in order until one of them computes true, at which point the
corresponding branch body is run.
7 Correctness of the Fault Handler Generator
We now turn our attention to verification, beginning with the fault handler. We must show that the gen-
erated fault handler emulates the IFC enforcement judgment `R (Lpc, `1, `2, `3) ;opcode Lrpc, Lr of the
symbolic rule machine. The statement and proof of correctness are parametric over the symbolic IFC rule
tableR and concrete lattice, and hence over correctness lemmas for the lattice operations.
Correctness statement Let R be an arbitrary rule table and φR , genFaultHandler R be the corre-
sponding generated fault handler. We specify how φR behaves as a whole—as a relation between initial
state on entry and final state on completion—using the relation φ ` cs1 →?k cs2, defined as the reflexive
transitive closure of the concrete step relation, with the constraints that the fault handler code is φ and all
intermediate states (i.e., strictly preceding cs2) have privilege bit k.
The correctness statement is captured by the following two lemmas. Intuitively, if the symbolic IFC en-
forcement judgment allows some given user instruction, then executing φR (stored at kernel mode location
0) updates the cache to contain the tag encoding of the appropriate result labels and returns to user-mode;
otherwise, φR halts the machine (pc = -1).
Lemma 7.1 (Fault handler correctness, allowed case).
Suppose that `R (Lpc, `1, `2, `3);opcode Lrpc, Lr and
κi = opcode Tag(Lpc) Tag(`1) Tag(`2) Tag(`3) .
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genFaultHandler R = genComputeResultsR ++
genStoreResults ++
genIf [Ret] [Push (-1); Jump]
genComputeResultsR =
genIndexedCases [] genMatchOp (genApplyRule ◦ RuleR) opcodes
genMatchOp op =
[Push op] ++ genLoadFrom addrOpLabel ++ genEqual
genEqual = [Sub] ++ genNot
genApplyRule 〈allow , erpc, er〉 = genBool allow ++
genIf (genSome (genELab erpc ++ genELab er)) genNone
genELab BOT = genBot
LABi = genLoadFrom addrTagi
LE1 unionsq LE2 = genELab LE2 ++ genELab LE1 ++ genJoin
genBool TRUE = genTrue
LE1 v LE2 = genELab LE2 ++ genELab LE1 ++ genFlows
genStoreResults =
genIf (genStoreAt addrTagr ++ genStoreAt addrTagrpc ++ genTrue)
genFalse
genFalse = [Push 0]
genTrue = [Push 1]
genAnd = genIf [ ] (genPop ++ genFalse)
genOr = genIf (genPop ++ genTrue) [ ]
genNot = genIf genFalse genTrue
genImpl = genNot ++ genOr
genSome c = c ++ genTrue
genNone = genFalse
genIndexedCases genDefault genGuard genBody = g
where g [] = genDefault
g (n :: ns) = genGuard n ++ genIf (genBody n) (g ns)
genIf t f = genSkipIf (length f ′) ++ f ′ ++ t
where f ′ = f ++ genSkip(length t)
genSkip n = genTrue ++ genSkipIf n
genSkipIf n = [Bnz (n+1)]
genStoreAt p = [Push p;Store]
genLoadFrom p = [Push p; Load]
genPop = [Bnz 1]
opcodes = [add; output; . . . ; ret]
Figure 10: Generation of fault handler from IFC rule table.
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Then
φR ` 〈k [κi, κo] µ [(pc,u);σ] 0@TD〉 →?k
〈u [κi, κ′o] µ [σ] pc〉
with output cache κ′o = (Tag (Lrpc),Tag (Lr)) .
Lemma 7.2 (Fault handler correctness, disallowed case). Suppose that `R (Lpc, `1, `2, `3) 6;opcode, and
κi = opcode Tag(Lpc) Tag(`1) Tag(`2) Tag(`3) .
Then, for some final stack σ′,
φR ` 〈k [κi, κo] µ [(pc,u);σ] 0@TD〉 →?k
〈k [κi, κo] µ [σ′] -1@TD〉.
Proof methodology The fault handler is compiled by composing generators (Figure 10); accordingly, the
proofs of these two lemmas reduce to correctness proofs for the generators. We employ a custom Hoare
logic for specifying the generators themselves, which makes the code generation proof simple, reusable,
and scalable. This is where defining a DSL for IFC rules and a structured compiler proves to be very useful
approach, e.g., compared to symbolic interpretation of hand-written code.
Our logic comprises two kinds of Hoare triples. The generated code mostly consists of self-contained
instruction sequences that terminate by “falling off the end”—i.e., that never return or jump outside them-
selves, although they may contain internal jumps (e.g., to implement conditionals). The only exception is
the final step of the handler (third line of genFaultHandler in Figure 10). We therefore define a standard
Hoare triple {P} c {Q}, suitable for reasoning about self-contained code, and use it for the bulk of the
proof. To specify the final handler step, we define a non-standard triple {P} c {Q}Opc for reasoning about
escaping code.
Self-contained-code Hoare triples The triple {P} c {Q}, where P and Q are predicates on κ× σ, says
that, if the kernel instruction memory φ contains the code sequence c starting at the current PC, and if
the current memory and stack satisfy P , then the machine will run (in kernel mode) until the PC points to
the instruction immediately following the sequence c, with a resulting memory and stack satisfying Q . In
symbols:
{P} c {Q} , c = φ(n), . . . , φ(n′ − 1) ∧ P(κ, σ) =⇒
∃ κ′ σ′. Q(κ′, σ′) ∧ φ ` 〈k κ µ [σ] n@TD〉 →?k 〈k κ′ µ [σ′] n ′@TD〉
Note that the instruction memory φ is unconstrained outside of c, so if c is not self-contained, no triple
about it will be provable; thus, these triples obey the usual composition laws (e.g., the rule of consequence).
{P} [] {P}
∀κσ. P ′(κ, σ) =⇒ P(κ, σ)
∀κσ. Q(κ, σ) =⇒ Q ′(κ, σ)
{P} c {Q}
{P ′} c {Q ′}
{P1} c1 {P2} {P2} c2 {P3}
{P1} c1++c2 {P3}
Also, because the concrete machine is deterministic, these triples express total, rather than partial, correct-
ness, which is essential for proving termination in Lemma 7.1 and Lemma 7.2. To aid automation of proofs
about code sequences, we give triples in weakest-precondition style.
We build proofs by composing atomic specifications of individual instructions, such as
P(κ, σ) := ∃n1 T1 n2 T2 σ′. σ = n1@T1,n2@T2, σ′ ∧ Q(κ, ((n1+n2)@TD, σ′))
{P} [Add] {Q} ,
with specifications for structured code generators, such as
P(κ, σ) := ∃n Tσ′. σ = n@T, σ′ ∧ (n 6= 0 =⇒ P1(κ, σ′)) ∧ (n = 0 =⇒ P2(κ, σ′))
{P1} c1 {Q} {P2} c2 {Q}
{P} genIf c1 c2 {Q} .
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(We emphasize that all such specifications are verified, not axiomatized as the inference rule notation might
suggest.) We also prove a specification for the specialized case statement genIndexedCases. Although this
specification is quite complex when written in full detail (and thus omitted here), it is intuitively simple:
given a list of indices and functions for generating guards and branches from the indices, genIndexedCases
will run the guards in order until one of them computes true (more precisely, its integer encoding 1), at
which point the corresponding branch is run.
The concrete implementations of the lattice operations are also specified using triples in this style.
P(κ, σ) := Q(κ, (Tag (⊥)@TD, σ))
{P} genBot {Q}
P(κ, σ) := ∃LL′ σ′. σ = Tag (L)@TD,Tag (L′)@TD, σ′ ∧ Q(κ,Tag (L∨L′)@TD, σ′)
{P} genJoin {Q}
P(κ, σ) := ∃LL′ σ′. σ = Tag (L)@TD,Tag (L′)@TD, σ′ ∧ Q(κ, (if L ≤ L′ then 1 else 0)@TD, σ′)
{P} genFlows {Q}
For the two-point lattice, it is easy to prove that the implemented operators satisfy these specifications;
Section 11 describes an analogous result for a lattice of sets of principals.
Going a bit further towards bridging the gap between the symbolic rule and concrete machines, we
prove specifications for the generation of label expressions
(Lpc,L1,L2,L3) ` LE ↓ L
κ0 = op Tag(Lpc) Tag(L1) Tag(L2) Tag(L3)
P(κ, σ) := κ = κ0 ∧ Q(κ, (Tag (L)@TD, σ))
{P} genELabLE {Q}
and for the code generated to implement the application of a symbolic IFC symbolic rule. For instance, the
case where the instruction is allowed is described by the following specification (the integer 1 pushed on
the output stack encodes the fact that the rule is allowed):
RuleR(op) = 〈allow , erpc, er〉
κ0 = op Tag(Lpc) Tag(L1) Tag(L2) Tag(L3)
`R (Lpc,L1,L2,L3);op Lrpc, Lr
P(κ, σ) := κ = κ0 ∧ Q(κ, (1@TD,Tag (Lr)@TD,Tag (Lrpc)@TD, σ))
{P} genApplyRule 〈allow , erpc, er〉 {Q}
Escaping-code Hoare triples To be able to specify the entire code of the generated fault handler, we also
define a second form of triple, {P} c {Q}Opc , which specifies mostly self-contained, total code c that either
makes exactly one jump outside of c or returns out of kernel mode. This non-locality is needed because the
fault handler checks whether an information-flow violation is about to occur, and returns to the user-mode
caller if not, or jumps to an invalid address otherwise. More precisely, if P and Q are predicates on κ× σ
and O is a function from κ × σ to outcomes (the constants Success and Failure), then {P} c {Q}Opc
holds if, whenever the kernel instruction memory φ contains the sequence c starting at the current PC, the
current cache and stack satisfy P , and
• if O computes Success then the machine runs (in kernel mode) until it returns to user code at pc,
and Q is satisfied.
• if O computes Failure then the machine runs (in kernel mode) until it halts (pc = −1 in kernel
mode), and Q is satisfied.
Or, in symbols,
{P} c {Q}Opc , c = φ(n), . . . , φ(n+ |c| − 1) ∧ P(κ, σ) =⇒
∃ κ′ σ′. Q(κ′, σ′)
∧(O(κ, σ) = Success =⇒ φ ` 〈k κ µ [σ] n@TD〉 →?k 〈u κ′ µ [σ′] pc〉)
∧(O(κ, σ) = Failure =⇒ φ ` 〈k κ µ [σ] n@TD〉 →?k 〈k κ′ µ [σ′] −1@TD〉)
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To compose self-contained code with escaping code, we prove two composition laws for these triples,
one for pre-composing with specified self-contained code and another for post-composing with arbitrary
(unreachable) code:
{P1} c1 {P2} {P2} c2 {P3}Opc
{P1} c1++c2 {P3}Opc
{P} c1 {Q}Opc
{P} c1++c2 {Q}Opc
We use these new triples to specify the Ret and Jump instructions, which could not be given useful speci-
fications using the self-contained-code triples:
P(κ, σ) := ∃σ′. Q(κ, σ′) ∧ σ = (pc,u);σ′
O(κ, σ) := Success
{P} [Ret] {Q}Opc
P(κ, σ) := ∃σ′. Q(κ, σ′) ∧ σ = (−1)@ , σ′
O(κ, σ) := Failure
{P} [Jump] {Q}Opc
Everything comes together in verifying the fault handler. We use contained-code triples to specify
everything except for [Ret], [Jump], and the final genIf, and then use the escaping-code triple composition
laws to connect the non-returning part of the fault handler to the final genIf.
8 Refinement
We have two remaining verification goals. First, we want to show that the concrete machine of Section 5
(running the fault handler of Section 6 compiled from Rabs) enjoys TINI. Proving this directly for the
concrete machine would be dauntingly complex, so instead we show that the concrete machine is an im-
plementation of the abstract machine, for which noninterference will be much easier to prove (Section 10).
Second, since a trivial always-diverging machine also has TINI, we want to show that the concrete machine
is a faithful implementation of the abstract machine that emulates all its behaviors.
We phrase these two results using the notion of machine refinement, which we develop in this section,
and which we prove in Section 10 to be TINI preserving. In Section 9, we prove a two-way refinement (one
direction for each goal), between the abstract and concrete machines, via the symbolic rule machine in both
directions.
From here on we sometimes mention different machines (abstract, symbolic rule, or concrete) in the
same statement (e.g., when discussing refinement), and sometimes talk about machines generically (e.g.,
when defining TINI for all our machines); for these purposes, it is useful to define a generic notion of
machine.
Definition 8.1. A generic machine (or just machine) is a 5-tuple M = (S,E, I, · .−→·, Init), where S is a set
of states (ranged over by s), E is a set of events (ranged over by e), · .−→· ⊆ S × (E + {τ}) × S is a step
relation, and I is a set of input data (ranged over by i) that can be used to build initial states of the machine
with the function Init ∈ I → S. We call E + {τ} the set of actions of M (ranged over by α).
Conceptually, a machine’s program is included in its input data and gets “loaded” by the function Init ,
which also initializes the machine memory, stack, and PC. The notion of generic machine abstracts all these
details, allowing uniform definitions of refinement and TINI that apply to all three of our IFC machines. To
avoid stating it several times below, we stipulate that when we instantiate Definition 8.1 to any of our IFC
machines, Init must produce an initial stack with no return frames.
A generic step s1
e−→ s2 or s1 τ−→ s2 produces event e or is silent. The reflexive-transitive closure of
such steps, omitting silent steps (written s1
t−→? s2) produces traces—i.e., lists, t, of events. It is defined
inductively by
s
−→? s
s1
e−→ s2 s2 t−→? s3
s1
e.t−−→? s3
s1
τ−→ s2 s2 t−→? s3
s1
t−→? s3
(1)
where we write  for the empty trace and e.t for consing e to t. When the end state of a step starting in state
s is not relevant we write s e−→, and similarly s t−→? for traces.
When relating executions of two different machines through a refinement, we establish a correspondence
between their traces. This relation is usually derived from an elementary relation on events, . ⊆ E1 × E2,
which is lifted to actions and traces:
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Definition 8.2 (Matching). Given a relation . ⊆ E1 × E2 between two sets of events, its lifts to actions
and traces are defined:
α1 [.] α2 , (α1 = τ = α2 ∨ α1 = e1 . e2 = α2)
~x [.] ~y , length(~x) = length(~y) ∧ ∀ i < length(~x). xi . yi.
We are now ready to define refinement.
Definition 8.3 (Refinement). Let M1 = (S1, E1, I1, · .−→1 ·, Init1) and M2 = (S2, E2, I2, · .−→2 ·, Init2)
be two machines. A refinement of M1 into M2 is a pair of relations (.i, .e), where .i ⊆ I1 × I2 and
.e ⊆ E1×E2, such that whenever i1.i i2 and Init2(i2) t2−→?, there exists a trace t1 such that Init1(i1) t1−→?
and t1 [.e] t2. We also say that M2 refines M1. Graphically:
i1 Init1(i1)
i2 Init2(i2)
.i
t1
t2
[.e]
(Plain lines denote premises, dashed ones conclusions.)
In order to prove refinement, we need a variant that considers executions starting at arbitrary related
states.
Definition 8.4 (Refinement via states). Let M1, M2 be as above. A state refinement of M1 into M2 is a
pair of relations (.s, .e), where .s ⊆ S1×S2 and .e ⊆ E1×E2, such that, whenever s1 .s s2 and s2 t2−→?,
there exists t1 such that s1
t1−→? and t1 [.e] t2.
s1
s2
.s
t1
t2
[.e]
If the relation on inputs is compatible with the one on states, we can use state refinement to prove
refinement.
Lemma 8.5. Suppose i1 .i i2 ⇒ Init1(i1) .s Init2(i2), for all i1 and i2. If (.s, .e) is a state refinement
then (.i, .e) is a refinement.
Our plan to derive a refinement between the abstract and concrete machines via the symbolic rule
machine requires composition of refinements.
Lemma 8.6 (Refinement Composition). Let (.12i , .12e ) be a refinement betweenM1 andM2, and (.23i , .23e )
a refinement between M2 and M3. The pair (.23i ◦ .12i , .23e ◦ .12e ) that composes the matching relations for
initial data and events on each layer is a refinement between M1 and M3. This can be summarized in the
following diagram:
i1 s1
i2 s2
i3 s3
∗t1
∗t2
∗
t3
.12i
.23i
[.23e ◦ .12e ].23i ◦ .12i
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9 Refinements Between Concrete and Abstract
In this section, we show that (1) the concrete machine refines the symbolic rule machine, and (2) vice versa.
Using (1) we will be able to show in Section 10 that the concrete machine is noninterfering. From (2)
we know that the concrete machine faithfully implements the abstract one, exactly reflecting its execution
traces.
9.1 Abstract and symbolic rule machines
The symbolic rule machine (with the rule table Rabs) is a simple reformulation of the abstract machine.
Their step relations are (extensionally) equal, and started from the same input data they emit the same
traces.
Definition 9.1 (Abstract and symbolic rule machines as generic machines). For both abstract and symbolic
rule machines, input data is a 4-tuple (p, args, n,L) where p is a program, args is a list of atoms (the initial
stack), and n is the size of the memory, initialized with n copies of 0@L. The initial PC is 0@L.
Lemma 9.2. The symbolic rule machine instantiated with the rule table Rabs refines the abstract machine
through (=,=).
9.2 Concrete machine refines symbolic rule machine
We prove this refinement using a fixed but arbitrary rule table,R, an abstract lattice of labels, and a concrete
lattice of tags. The proof uses the correctness of the fault handler (Section 7), so we assume that the fault
handler of the concrete machine corresponds to the rule table of the symbolic rule machine (φ = φR) and
that the encoding of abstract labels as integer tags is correct.
Definition 9.3 (Concrete machine as generic machine). The input data of the concrete machine is a 4-
tuple (p, args, n, T) where p is a program, args is a list of concrete atoms (the initial stack), and the initial
memory is n copies of 0@T. The initial PC is 0@T. The machine starts in user mode, the cache is initialized
with an illegal opcode so that the first instruction always faults (giving the fault handler a chance to run and
install a correct rule without requiring the initialization process to invent one), and the fault handler code
parameterizing the machine is installed in the initial privileged instruction memory φ.
The input data and events of the symbolic rule and concrete machines are of different kinds; they are
matched using relations (.ci and .
c
e respectively) stipulating that payload values should be equal and that
labels should correspond to tags modulo the function Tag of the concrete lattice.
args ′ = map (λ(n@L). n@Tag(L)) args
(p, args, n,L) .ci (p, args
′, n,Tag(L)) n@L .ce n@Tag(L)
Theorem 9.4. The concrete IFC machine refines the symbolic rule machine, through (.ci , .ce).
We prove this theorem by a refinement via states (Lemma 9.7); this, in turn, relies on two technical
lemmas (9.5 and 9.6).
We begin by defining a matching relation .cs between the states of the concrete and symbolic rule
machines such that
1. iq .ci ic ⇒ Initq(iq) .cs Initc(ic),
2. (.cs, .
c
e) is a state refinement of the symbolic rule machine into the concrete machine.
We define .cs as
R ` κ σq .σ σc µq .m µc
µq, [σq],n@L .cs u, κ, µc, [σc],n@Tag(L)
(2)
where the new notations are defined as follows. The relation .m demands that the memories be equal up to
the conversion of labels to concrete tags. The relation .σ on stacks is similar, but additionally requires that
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return frames in the concrete stack have their privilege bit set to u. The basic idea is to match, in .cs, only
concrete states that are in user mode. We also need to track an extra invariant,R ` κ, which means that the
cache κ is consistent with the tableR—i.e., κ never lies. More precisely, the output part of κ represents the
result of applying the symbolic rule judgment ofR to the opcode and labels represented in the input part of
κ.
R ` [κi, κo] , ∀opcode L1 L2 L3 Lpc,
κi = opcode Tag(Lpc) Tag(L1) Tag(L2) Tag(L3) ⇒
∃Lrpc Lr,`R (Lpc,L1,L2,L3);opcode Lrpc, Lr ∧ κo = (Tag (Lrpc),Tag (Lr))
To prove refinement via states, we must account for two situations. First, suppose the concrete machine
can take a user step. In this case, we match that step with a single symbolic rule machine step. We write
cspi to denote a concrete state cs whose privilege bit is pi.
Lemma 9.5 (Refinement, non-faulting concrete step). Let csu1 be a concrete state and suppose that csu1
αc−→
csu2. Let qs1 be a symbolic rule machine state with qs1 .
c
s cs
u
1. Then there exist qs2 and αa such that
qs1
αa−−→ qs2, with qs2 .cs csu2, and αa [.ce] αc. Graphically:
qs1 qs2
csu1 cs
u
2αc
.cs
αa
.cs [.
c
e]
Proof. We know that qs1 .cs cs
u
1. By definition of .
c
s in (2), qs1 and cs
u
1 are at the same opcode with the
same stack and memory (up to translation between labels and tags), andR ` κ(csu1). Thus κ(csu1) matches
a line of the symbolic IFC rule table, and since the concrete machine performs a user step from csu1 to cs
u
2,
it is a line that allows a step to be taken. We conclude that the symbolic rule machine is able to perform the
step to qs2 as required.
The second case is when the concrete machine faults into kernel mode and returns to user mode after
some number of steps.
Lemma 9.6 (Refinement, faulting concrete step). Let csu0 be a concrete state, and suppose that the concrete
machine does a faulting step to csk1, stays in kernel mode until cs
k
n, and then exits kernel mode by stepping
to csun+1. Let qs0 be a state of the symbolic rule machine that matches cs
u
0. Then qs0.
c
s cs
u
n+1. Graphically:
qs0
csu0 cs
k
1 cs
k
n cs
u
n+1τ
?
k τ
.cs
.cs
Proof. Since the concrete machine performs a faulting step from csu0 to cs
k
1, we know that the current
cache input, κi(csk1), corresponds to the current instruction and the tags it manipulates (they have been
put there when entering kernel mode). Now, there are two cases. If evaluating the corresponding IFC
rule at the symbolic rule level succeeds, then we apply Lemma 7.1 to conclude directly. Otherwise, we
apply Lemma 7.2 and derive that the fault handler ends up in a failing state in kernel mode. This contradicts
our initial hypothesis saying that the concrete machine performed a sequence of steps returning to user-
mode.
Given two matching states of the concrete and symbolic rule machines, and a concrete execution starting
at that concrete state, these two lemmas can be applied repeatedly to build a matching execution of the
symbolic rule machine. There is just one last case to consider, namely when the execution ends with a fault
into kernel mode and never returns to user mode. However, no output is produced in this case, guaranteeing
that the full trace is matched. We thus derive the following refinement via states, of which Theorem 9.4 is
a corollary.
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Lemma 9.7. The pair (.cs, .ce) defines a refinement via states between the symbolic rule machine and the
concrete machine.
9.3 Concrete machine refines abstract machine
By composing the refinement of Lemma 9.2 and the refinement of Theorem 9.4 instantiated to the concrete
machine running φRabs , we can conclude that the concrete machine refines the abstract one:
Theorem 9.8. The concrete IFC machine refines the abstract IFC machine via (.cs, .ce).
9.4 Abstract machine refines concrete machine
The previous refinement, (.cs, .
c
e), would also hold if the fault handler never returned when called. So,
to ensure the concrete machine reflects the behaviors of the abstract machine, we next prove an inverse
refinement:
Theorem 9.9. The abstract IFC machine refines the concrete IFC machine via (.−ci , .−ce ), where .
−c
i and
.−ce are the relational inverses of .
c
i and .
c
e.
This guarantees that traces of the abstract machine are also emitted by the concrete machine. As above
we use the symbolic rule machine as an intermediate step and show a state refinement of the concrete into
the symbolic rule machine. We rely on the following lemma.
Lemma 9.10 (Forward refinement). Let qs0 and cs0 be two states with cs0 .−cs qs0. Suppose that the
symbolic rule machine takes a step qs0
αa−−→ qs1. Then there exist concrete state cs1 and action αc such that
cs0
αc−→? cs1, with cs1 .−cs qs1 and αc [.−ce ] αa.
cs0 • · · · • cs1
qs0 qs1
τ τ τ αc
.−cs .
−c
s
αa
[.−ce ]
where .−cs and .
−c
e denote the inverses of .
c
s and .
c
e, respectively.
Proof. Because cs0 .−cs qs0, the cache is consistent with the symbolic rule table R. If the cache input
matches the opcode and data of cs0, then (because qs0
αa−−→ qs1) the cache output must allow a step
cs0
αc−→ cs1 as required. On the other hand, if the cache input does not match the opcode and data of
cs0, then a cache fault occurs, loading the cache input and calling the fault handler. By Lemma 7.1 and the
fact that qs0
αa−−→ qs1, the cache output is computed to be consistent with R, and this allows the concrete
step as claimed.
9.5 Discussion
The two top-level refinement properties (Theorem 9.4 and Theorem 9.9) share the same notion of matching
relations but they have been proved independently in our Coq development. In the context of compiler
verification [57, 81], another proof methodology has been favored: a backward simulation proof can be
obtained from a proof of forward simulation under the assumption that the lower-level machine is deter-
ministic. (CompCertTSO [81] also requires a receptiveness hypothesis that trivially holds in our context.)
Since our concrete machine is deterministic, we could apply a similar technique. However, unlike in com-
piler verification where it is common to assume that the source program has a well-defined semantics (i.e.
it does not get stuck), we would have to consider the possibility that the high-level semantics (the sym-
bolic rule machine) might block and prove that in this case either the IFC enforcement judgment is stuck
(and Lemma 9.6 applies) or the current symbolic rule machine state and matching concrete state are both
ill-formed.
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10 Noninterference
In this section we define TINI [2, 43] for generic machines (recall Definition 8.1), and present a set of
unwinding conditions [37] sufficient to guarantee TINI for a generic machine (Theorem 10.3); we show
that the abstract machine of Section 3 satisfies these unwinding conditions and thus satisfies TINI (Theo-
rem 10.5), that TINI is preserved by refinement (Theorem 10.6), and finally, using the fact that the con-
crete IFC machine refines the abstract one (Theorem 9.4), that the concrete machine satisfies TINI (Theo-
rem 10.8).
Termination-insensitive noninterference (TINI) To define noninterference, we need to talk about what
can be observed about the output trace produced by a run of a machine.
Definition 10.1 (Observation). A notion of observation for a generic machine is a 3-tuple (Ω, b·c·, ·≈i··). Ω
is a set of observers (i.e., different degrees of power to observe), ranged over by o. For each o ∈ Ω, b·co ⊆ E
is a predicate of observability of events for observer o, and · ≈io · ⊆ I × I is a relation of indistinguishability
of input data for observer o.
The predicate beco is used to filter unobservable events from traces (written btco):
bco = 
be.tco =
{
e.btco if beco
btco otherwise
Also a notion of indistinguishability of traces (written t1 ≈t t2) is defined inductively:
 ≈t t t ≈t 
t1 ≈t t2
e.t1 ≈t e.t2 (3)
This definition truncates the longer trace to the same length as the shorter and then demands that the re-
maining elements be pairwise identical.
Definition 10.2 (TINI). A machine (S,E, I, · .−→·, Init) with a notion of observation (Ω, b·c·, ·≈i· ·) satisfies
TINI if, for any observer o ∈ Ω, pair of indistinguishable initial data i1 ≈io i2, and pair of executions
Init(i1)
t1−→? and Init(i2) t2−→?, we have bt1co ≈t bt2co.
Notice that the input data for our machines includes the program to be executed; hence, we can apply
the definition above to the execution of different programs. The reason for calling this notion “termination
insensitive” is that, because of truncated traces in (3), we only model the case where we distinguish two runs
of the same program by observing two distinguishable events that occur on the same position. Hence, this
definition does not attempt to protect against attackers that try to learn a secret by seeing whether a program
terminates or not: our observers cannot distinguish between successful termination, failure with an error,
or entering an infinite loop with no observable output. This TINI property is standard for a machine with
output [2, 43].4
Unwinding conditions Having defined TINI for generic notions of machine and observation, we now
explain a sufficient set of conditions for such a machine to have the TINI property and sketch a proof of
TINI from these conditions. The proof technique is standard [37].
A silent action cannot be observed, so we extend the given predicate beco to actions by stating that
bτco never holds. From this we inductively define a notion of indistinguishability of actions to observer o
(written α1 ≈ao α2):
α ≈ao α
¬bα1co ¬bα2co
α1 ≈ao α2
. (4)
Two actions are indistinguishable to o if either they are equal, or if neither can be observed by o.
4It is called “progress-insensitive noninterference” in a recent survey [43]. We have stated it for inductively defined executions
and traces (1), which is all we need in this paper, but it can easily be lifted to coinductive executions and traces: not only successfully
terminating and finitely failing executions, but also infinite executions. This holds because TINI is a 2-safety hyperproperty [22]; a
formal proof of this can be found in our Coq development.
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Theorem 10.3. A machine (S,E, I, · .−→·, Init) with notion of observation (Ω, b·c·, ·≈i· ·) satisfies TINI if,
for each o ∈ Ω, there exist two relations, indistinguishability of states to observer o (written s1 ≈so s2) and
observability of states to observer o (written bsco), satisfying four sanity conditions
i1 ≈io i2 =⇒ Init(i1) ≈so Init(i2) (5)
s1 ≈so s2 =⇒ s2 ≈so s1 (6)
s1 ≈so s2 =⇒ (bs1co ⇔ bs2co) (7)
(bαco ∧ s α−→) =⇒ bsco (8)
and three unwinding conditions, assuming s1 ≈so s2 and s1 α1−→ s′1:
(bs1co ∧ s2 α2−→ s′2) =⇒ (α1 ≈ao α2 ∧ s′1 ≈so s′2) (9)
(¬bs1co ∧ ¬bs′1co) =⇒ s′1 ≈so s2 (10)
(¬bs1co ∧ bs′1co ∧ bs′2co ∧ s2 α2−→ s′2) =⇒ s′1 ≈so s′2 (11)
We outline the proof, which motivates each of the sanity and unwinding conditions. To prove TINI we
must consider pairs of traces of machine evaluations starting from initial states Init(i1) and Init(i2) and
show that, after filtering for observability, these pairs of traces are indistinguishable. For the proof, we also
maintain the invariant that the pairs of states reached by the two evaluations are indistinguishable. We are
given that i1 ≈io i2, so by (5) the initial states are indistinguishable, as are the traces emitted so far (namely
).
Now suppose the two evaluations have arrived at two indistinguishable states, s1 ≈so s2, and that the
filtered traces emitted so far are indistinguishable. If s1 can take a step, s1
α1−→ s′1, what is possible for
steps from s2? (We may assume that s2
α2−→ s′2: if no step is possible from s2 then we are already done
because (3), used in the definition of TINI, truncates the trace from s1 at this point.) Proceed by cases on
observability of s1.
Condition (9) says that, if bs1co, then the new states, s′1 and s′2, and the emitted traces remain indistin-
guishable.
On the other hand, suppose ¬bs1co; proceed by cases on observability of s′1. (10) says that, if ¬bs′1co,
then s′1 ≈so s2; and by (8), since s1 is unobservable, α1 must be unobservable, so the filtered emitted traces
remain indistinguishable.
Finally, the case where ¬bs1co and bs′1co. Then ¬bs2co (by (7)), and α1 and α2 are both unobservable
by (8). Consider cases on observability of s′2. The filtered traces emitted up to s
′
1 and s
′
2 are indistinguish-
able, and if bs′2co we are done by (11). If ¬bs′2co, we are in a case symmetric to the paragraph above; by (6)
and (10) we have s1 ≈so s′2, and again the filtered traces emitted up to these points are indistinguishable.
TINI for abstract IFC machine We now instantiate Theorem 10.3 with the abstract machine defined in
Section 3, showing it satisfies TINI for the following notion of observation:
Definition 10.4 (Observation for abstract machine). Let L be a lattice, with partial order≤. For the abstract
machine, events n@L are atoms; we define indistinguishability of atoms, a1 ≈aao a2, as in (4) above. The
notion of observation for the abstract machine is (L, b·ca· , · ≈ia· ·), where
bn@Lcao , L ≤ o
(p, args1 , n,L) ≈iao (p, args2 , n,L) , args1 [≈aao ] args2 .
(On the right-hand side of the second equation, [≈aao ] is indistinguishability of atoms, lifted to lists as in
Definition 8.2.)
To instantiate Theorem 10.3 we must exhibit relations of observability and indistinguishability on states.
We outline these definitions and the proofs of the sanity and unwinding conditions here.
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A state s = 〈µ [σ] pc〉 of the abstract machine is observable by observer o ∈ L, written bsco, whenever
pc = n@Lpc is itself observable, i.e., Lpc ≤ o.
Indistinguishability of states is defined by two clauses: the first for observable states (left), and the other
for non-observable ones (right).
bpcco
σ1 [≈aao ] σ2 µ1 [≈aao ] µ2
µ1 [σ1] pc ≈sao µ2 [σ2] pc
¬bpc1co ¬bpc2co
σ1 ∼ao σ2 µ1 [≈aao ] µ2
µ1 [σ1] pc1 ≈sao µ2 [σ2] pc2
Here we abuse the notation of lifting, [≈aao ], using it for memories and stacks (two stack elements are
indistinguishable if they are indistinguishable atoms, or are both return stack frames, with indistinguishable
return addresses).
Let’s have a more detailed look at the definition of state indistinguishability. For observable states,
we simply require that all the state components be indistinguishable. For non-observable ones, however,
we must make the relation more permissive. Indeed, the abstract IFC machine steps from an observable
state to a non-observable state when, e.g., branching on the value of a secret. When that happens, the tight
correspondence on states no longer holds. Depending on the value of a secret, the machine could, e.g.,
jump to different instruction addresses, put different numbers of values on its stack, perform more or fewer
function calls, etc. Because of that, we must allow states with different pc values to be related, and adopt
a weaker indistinguishability relation on stacks. This new relation, noted ∼ao , only is used when relating
unobservable states, and intuitively says that the stacks of such states only need to be related up to the most
recent return frame to an observable one. Formally, σ1 ∼ao σ2 is defined as bσ1co [≈aao ] bσ2co, where:
b[ ]co , [ ]
bn@L, σco , bσco
bn@L;σco ,
{
n@L;σ if L ≤ o
bσco otherwise
In this way we relax the correspondence between call stacks of two machines, while at the same time
keeping the invariant that holds on the “observable” part of the stacks, which we will need when proving
Equation 11 for the abstract machine.
Theorem 10.5. The relations b·ca· and · ≈sa· · satisfy the sanity and unwinding conditions of Theorem 10.3;
thus, the abstract IFC machine has TINI.
Proof. Most sanity conditions are easy consequences of the definitions, and do not require detailed expla-
nation. We give an overview of the most interesting aspects of the proof; a more detailed account can be
found in the formal development.
The Output instruction plays an important role for condition (8) and for the first conclusion of (9).
Crucially, since that instruction joins the label of the current pc to the output atom, an unobservable state
necessarily produces an unobservable action. Further, when two low states are indistinguishable and step
(i.e., when they satisfy the preconditions of (9)), the atoms on top of the stack must be indistinguishable,
leading to indistinguishable output actions.
As for the second conclusion of (9), since indistinguishable low states have equal pc values, they ex-
ecute the same instructions. Thus, showing that the states remain indistinguishable after stepping is just a
matter of reasoning about the values that are used by each instruction on both states. These values must be
indistinguishable, and it is easy to show that storing them at the same locations in indistinguishable stacks
and memories leads to stacks and memories that are still indistinguishable.
Most of the cases of condition (10)—stepping from an unobservable state to another unobservable
state—are trivial, since they only manipulate values or unobservable return frames on top of the stack (which
by construction are irrelevant when checking whether the corresponding stacks are indistinguishable). The
only exception is the Store instruction, which also modifies the memory. Since the label on the pc is
assumed to be above the level of the observer, the side condition of that instruction ensures that the same
holds of the memory position being updated. This ensures that both memories remain indistinguishable,
since the other positions are not affected.
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Finally, the precondition of (11) (stepping from unobservable to observable states) only applies when
both states execute matching Ret instructions. Since we assume that the resulting states are both observable,
we conclude that the top of the original stacks contained the same observable return frame. The definition
of indistinguishability says that the portions of the stacks below that frame are indistinguishable. Since
those are exactly the values of the new stacks, and the returning pc is the same on both states, we conclude
that the resulting observable states are indistinguishable.
TINI preserved by refinement
Theorem 10.6 (TINI preservation). Suppose that the generic machineM2 refinesM1 by refinement (.i, .e)
and that each machine is equipped with a notion of observation. Suppose that, for all observers o2 of M2,
there exists an observer o1 of M1 such that the following compatibility conditions hold :
1. for all e1 ∈ E1 and e2 ∈ E2, e1 .e e2 ⇒ (be1co1 ⇔ be2co2)
2. for all i2, i′2 ∈ I2, i2 ≈io2 i′2 ⇒ ∃ i1, i′1 ∈ I1. i1≈io1i′1 ∧ i1 .i i2 ∧ i′1 .i i′2
3. for all e1, e′1 ∈ E1, and all e2, e′2 ∈ E2, (e1 ≈ao1 e′1 ∧ e1 .e e2 ∧ e′1 .e e′2) ⇒ e2 ≈ao2 e′2
Then, if M1 has TINI, M2 also has TINI.
Proof. We include a brief proof sketch to convey the meaning of the theorem and the role of the compati-
bility conditions; intuitively, they say that o1 does not have more observation power than o2. Suppose that
o2 observes two traces t2 and t′2, starting from initial states i2 and i
′
2. We want to show that both traces
are indistinguishable whenever the initial states are. By condition 2, we can find related initial states i1
and i′1 of M1 that are indistinguishable. Since M2 refines M1, we know that these initial states produce
traces t1 and t′1 that match t2 and t
′
2; furthermore, since M1 has TINI, t1 and t
′
1 are indistinguishable. By
condition 1, filtering related traces results in related traces; that is, bt1co1 [.e] bt2co2 , and similarly for the
other two traces. This implies, thanks to condition 3, that we can use the indistinguishability of bt1co1 and
bt′1co1 to argue that bt2co2 and bt′2co′2 are also indistinguishable, by a simple induction on the traces.
Some formulations of noninterference are subject to the refinement paradox [48], in which refinements
of a noninterferent system may violate noninterference. We avoid this issue by employing a strong notion
of noninterference that restricts the amount of non-determinism in the system and is thus preserved by any
refinement (Theorem 10.6).5 Since our abstract machine is deterministic, it is easy to show this strong
notion of noninterference for it. In Section 13 we discuss a possible technique for generalizing to the
concurrent setting while preserving a high degree of determinism.
TINI for concrete machine with IFC fault handler It remains to define a notion of observation on the
concrete machine, instantiating the definition of TINI for this machine. This definition refers to a concrete
lattice CL, which must be a correct encoding of an abstract lattice L: the lattice operators genBot, genJoin,
and genFlows must satisfy the specifications in Section 7.
Definition 10.7 (Observation for the concrete machine). Let L be an abstract lattice, and CL be correct
with respect to L. The observation for the concrete machine is (L, b·cc· , · ≈ic· ·), where
bn@Tcco , Lab(T) ≤ o,
(p, args ′1 , n, T) ≈ico (p, args ′2 , n, T) , args1 [≈aao ] args2 ,
and args ′i = map (λ(n@L). n@Tag(L)) argsi .
Finally, we prove that the backward refinement proved in Section 9 (Theorem 9.8) satisfies the compat-
ibility constraints of Theorem 10.6, so we derive the main result:
Theorem 10.8. The concrete IFC machine running the fault handler φRabs satisfies TINI.
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instr ::= extensions to instruction set
| . . .
| Alloc allocate a new frame
| SizeOf fetch frame size
| Eq value equality
| SysCall id system call
| GetOff extract pointer offset
| Pack atom from payload and tag
| Unpack atom into payload and tag
| PushCachePtr push cache address on stack
| Dupn duplicate atom on stack
| Swapn swap two data atoms on stack
Figure 11: Additional instructions for extensions
ι(n) = Alloc alloc k (L∨Lpc) aµ = (id , µ′)
µ [(Int k)@L, a, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→
µ′ [(Ptr (id , 0))@L, σ] (n+1)@Lpc
ι(n) = SizeOf length (µ(id)) = k
µ [(Ptr (id , o))@L, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ [(Int k)@L, σ] (n+1)@Lpc
ι(n) = GetOff
µ [(Ptr (id , o))@L, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ [(Int o)@L, σ] (n+1)@Lpc
ι(n) = Eq
µ [v1@L1, v2@L2, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→
µ [(Int (v1 == v2))@(L1∨L2), σ] (n+1)@Lpc
ι(n) = SysCall id T (id) = (k , f)
f(σ1) = v@L length (σ1) = k
µ [σ1++σ2] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ [v@L, σ2] (n+1)@Lpc
Figure 12: Semantics of selected new abstract machine instructions
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ι(n) = Alloc alloc k u a µ = (id , µ′)
µ(cache) = alloc Tpc T1 TD TD Trpc Tr
u µ [(Int k)@T1, a, σ] n@Tpc
τ−→
u µ′ [(Ptr (id , 0))@Tr, σ] (n+1)@Trpc
φ(n) = Alloc alloc k k a µ = (id , µ′)
k µ [(Int k)@ , a, σ] n@ τ−→
k µ′ [(Ptr (id , 0))@TD, σ] (n+1)@TD
φ(n) = PushCachePtr
k µ [σ] n@ τ−→ k µ [(Ptr (cache, 0))@TD, σ] (n+1)@TD
φ(n) = Unpack
k µ [v1@v2, σ] n@
τ−→ k µ [v2@TD, v1@TD, σ] (n+1)@TD
φ(n) = Pack
k µ [v2@ , v1@ , σ] n@
τ−→ k µ [v1@v2, σ] (n+1)@TD
ι(n) = SysCall id T (id) = (k ,n ′) length (σ1) = k
u µ [σ1++σ2] n@T
τ−→ k µ [σ1++(n+1@T,u);σ2] n ′@TD
Figure 13: Semantics of selected new concrete machine instructions
11 An Extended System
Thus far we have presented our methodology in the context of a simple machine architecture and IFC
discipline. We now show how it can be scaled up to a significantly more sophisticated setting, where the
basic machine is extended with a frame-based memory model supporting dynamic allocation and a system
call mechanism for adding special-purpose primitives. Building on these features, we define an abstract
IFC machine that uses sets of principals as its labels and a corresponding concrete machine implementation
where tags are pointers to dynamically allocated representations of these sets. While still much less complex
than the real SAFE system, this extended model serves as good evidence of the robustness our approach, and
how it might apply to more realistic designs: The new features were added by incrementally adapting the
Coq formalization of the basic system, without requiring any major changes to the initial proof architecture.
Figure 11 shows the new instructions supported by the extended model. Instruction PushCachePtr,
Unpack, and Pack are used only by the concrete machine, for the compiled fault handler (hence they only
have a kernel-mode stepping rule; they simply get stuck if executed outside kernel mode, or on an abstract
machine). We also add two stack-manipulation instructions, Dup and Swap, to make programming the
kernel routines more convenient. It remains true that any program for the abstract machine makes sense to
run on the abstract rule machine and the concrete machine. For brevity, we detail stepping rules only for
the extended abstract IFC machine (Figure 12) and concrete machine (Figure 13); corresponding extensions
to the symbolic IFC rule machine are straightforward (we also omit rules for Dup and Swap). Individual
rules are explained below.
11.1 Dynamic memory allocation
High-level programming languages usually assume a structured memory model, in which independently
allocated frames are disjoint by construction and programs cannot depend on the relative placement of
frames in memory. The SAFE hardware enforces this abstraction by attaching explicit runtime types to all
values, distinguishing pointers from other data. Only data marked as pointers can be used to access memory.
To obtain a pointer, one must either call the (privileged) memory manager to allocate a fresh frame or else
offset an existing pointer. In particular, it is not possible to “forge” a pointer from an integer. Each pointer
5The recent noninterference proof for the seL4 microkernel [65, 66] works similarly (see Section 12).
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also carries information about its base and bounds, and the hardware prevents it from being used to access
memory outside of its frame.
Frame-based memory model In our extended system, we model the user-level view of SAFE’s memory
system by adding a frame-structured memory (similar to [58]), distinguished pointers (so values, the pay-
load field of atoms and the tag field of concrete atoms, can now either be an integer (Intn) or a pointer
(Ptr p)), and an allocation instruction to our basic machines. We do this (nearly) uniformly at all levels
of abstraction.6 A pointer is a pair p = (id, o) of a frame identifier id and an offset o into that frame. In
the machine state, the data memory µ is a partial function from pointers to individual storage cells that is
undefined on out-of-frame pointers. By abuse of notation, µ is also a partial function from frame identifiers
to frames, which are just lists of atoms.
The most important new rule of the extended abstract machine is Alloc (Figure 12). In this machine
there is a separate memory region (assumed infinite) corresponding to each label. The auxiliary function
alloc in the rule for Alloc takes a size k, the label (region) at which to allocate, and a default atom a; it
extends µ with a fresh frame of size k, initializing its contents to a. It returns the id of the new frame and
the extended memory µ′.
IFC and memory allocation We require that the frame identifiers produced by allocation at one label
not be affected by allocations at other labels; e.g., alloc might allocate sequentially in each region. Thus,
indistinguishability of low atoms is just syntactic equality, preserving Definition 10.4 from the simple ab-
stract machine, which is convenient for proving noninterference, as we explain below. We allow a program
to observe frame sizes using a new SizeOf instruction, which requires tainting the result of Alloc with L,
the label of the size argument. There are also new instructions Eq, for comparing two values (including
pointers) for equality, and GetOff, for extracting the offset field of a pointer into an integer. However, frame
ids are intuitively abstract: the concrete representation of frame ids is not accessible, and pointers cannot
be forged or output. The extended concrete machine stepping rules for these new instructions are analogous
to the abstract machine rules, with the important exception of Alloc, which is discussed below.
A few small modifications to existing instructions in the basic machine (Figure 2) are needed to handle
pointers properly. In particular: (i) Load and Store require pointer arguments and get stuck if the pointer’s
offset is out of range for its frame. (ii) Add takes either two integers or an integer and a pointer, where
Intn + Intm = Int (n+m) and Ptr (id , o1) + Int o2 = Ptr (id , o1+o2). (iii) Output works only on
integers, not pointers. Analogous modifications are needed in the concrete machine semantic rules.
Concrete allocator The extended concrete machine’s semantics for Alloc differ from those of the abstract
machine in one key respect. Using one region per tag would not be a realistic strategy for a concrete
implementation; e.g., the number of different tags might be extremely large. Instead, we use a single region
for all user-mode allocations at the concrete level. We also collapse the separate user and kernel memories
from the basic concrete machine into a single memory. Since we still want to be able to distinguish user and
kernel frames, we mark each frame with a privilege mode (i.e., we use two allocation regions). Figure 13
shows the corresponding concrete stepping rule for Alloc for two cases: non-faulting user mode and kernel
mode. The rule cache is now just a distinguished kernel frame cache; to access it, the fault handler uses
the (privileged) PushCachePtr instruction. The concrete Load and Store rules are modified to prevent
dereferencing kernel pointers in user mode. These checks are only needed if we want to allow user-level
code to manipulate kernel pointers directly while protecting the data structures they point to. For instance,
we could allow certain operations on pointers representing labels, such as taking the join of two labels, while
preserving noninterference. If kernel pointers cannot be “leaked” into user data (as in subsection 11.3), these
checks can be safely omitted, since user-level code won’t be able to tamper with kernel data.
Proof by refinement As before, we prove noninterference for the concrete machine by combining a proof
of noninterference of the abstract machine with a two-stage proof that the concrete machine refines the ab-
stract machine. By using this approach we avoid some well-known difficulties in proving noninterference
6It would be interesting to describe an implementation of the memory manager in a still-lower-level concrete machine with no
built-in Alloc instruction, but we leave this as future work.
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directly for the concrete machine. In particular, when frames allocated in low and high contexts share the
same region, allocations in high contexts can cause variations in the precise pointer values returned for
allocations in low contexts, and these variations must be taken into account when defining the indistin-
guishability relation. For example, Banerjee and Naumann [11] prove noninterference by parameterizing
their indistinguishability relation with a partial bijection that keeps track of indistinguishable memory ad-
dresses. Our approach, by contrast, defines pointer indistinguishability only at the abstract level, where
indistinguishable low pointers are identical. This proof strategy still requires relating memory addresses
when showing refinement, but this relation does not appear in the noninterference proof at the abstract
level. The refinement proof itself uses a simplified form of memory injections [58]. The differences in the
memory region structure of both machines are significant, but invisible to programs, since no information
about frame ids is revealed to programs beyond what can be obtained by comparing pointers for equality.
This restriction allows the refinement proof to go through straightforwardly.
11.2 System calls
To support the implementation of policy-specific primitives on top of the concrete machine, we provide a
new system call instruction. The SysCall id instruction is parameterized by a system call identifier. The
step relation of each machine is now parameterized by a table T that maps system call identifiers to their
implementations.
In the abstract and symbolic rule machines, a system call implementation is an arbitrary Coq function
that removes a list of atoms from the top of the stack and either puts a result on top of the stack or fails,
halting the machine. The system call implementation is responsible for computing the label of the result
and performing any checks that are needed to ensure noninterference.
In the concrete machine, system calls are implemented by kernel routines and the call table contains the
entry points of these routines in the kernel instruction memory. Executing a system call involves inserting
the return address on the stack (underneath the call arguments) and jumping to the corresponding entry
point. The kernel code terminates either by returning a result to the user program or by halting the machine.
This feature has no major impact on the proofs of noninterference and refinement. For noninterference,
we must show that all the abstract system calls preserve indistinguishability of abstract machine states;
for refinement, we show that each concrete system call correctly implements the abstract one using the
machinery of Section 7.
11.3 Labeling with sets of principals
The full SAFE machine supports dynamic creation of security principals. In the extended model, we make
a first step toward dynamic principal creation by taking principals to be integers and instantiating the (para-
metric) lattice of labels with the lattice of finite sets of integers. This lattice is statically known, but models
dynamic creation by supporting unbounded labels and having no top element. In this lattice, ⊥ is ∅, ∨ is ∪,
and ≤ is ⊆. We enrich our IFC model by adding a new classification primitive joinP that adds a principal
to an atom’s label, encoded using the system call mechanism described above. The operation of joinP is
given by the following derived rule, which is an instance of the SysCall rule from Figure 12.
ι(n) = SysCall joinP
µ [v@L1, (Intm)@L2, σ] n@Lpc
τ−→ µ [v@(L1∨L2∨{m}), σ] (n+1)@Lpc
At the concrete level, a tag is now a pointer to an array of principals (integers) stored in kernel memory.
To keep the fault handler code simple, we do not maintain canonical representations of sets: one set may
be represented by different arrays, and a given array may have duplicate elements. (As a consequence,
the mapping from abstract labels to tags is no longer a function; we return to this point below.) Since the
fault handler generator in the basic system is parametric in the underlying lattice, it doesn’t require any
modification. All we must do is provide concrete implementations for the appropriate lattice operations:
genJoin just allocates a fresh array and concatenates both argument arrays into it; genFlows checks for array
inclusion by iterating through one array and testing whether each element appears in the other; and genBot
allocates a new empty array. Finally, we provide kernel code to implement joinP, which requires two new
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privileged instructions, Pack and Unpack (Figure 13), to manipulate the payload and tag fields of atoms;
otherwise, the implementation is similar to that of genJoin.
A more realistic system would keep canonical representations of sets and avoid unnecessary allocation
in order to improve its memory footprint and tag cache usage. But even with the present simplistic approach,
both the code for the lattice operations and their proofs of correctness are significantly more elaborate than
for the trivial two-point lattice. In particular, we need an additional code generator to build counted loops,
e.g., for computing the join of two tags.
genFor c = [Dup] ++ genIf (genLoop(c ++ [Push (−1),Add])) []
where genLoop c = c ++ [Dup,Bnz (−(length c+ 1))]
Here, c is a code sequence representing the loop body, which is expected to preserve an index value on top
of the stack; the generator builds code to execute that body repeatedly, decrementing the index each time
until it reaches 0. The corresponding specification is
Pn(κ, σ) := ∃ Tσ′. σ = n@T, σ′ ∧ Inv(κ, σ)
Qn(κ, σ) := ∃ Tσ′. σ = n@T, σ′ ∧ ∀ T′. Inv(κ, ((n − 1)@T′, σ′))
∀n. 0 < n =⇒ {Pn} c {Qn}
P(κ, σ) := ∃n Tσ′. 0 ≤ n ∧ σ = n@T, σ′ ∧ Inv(κ, σ)
Q(κ, σ) := ∃ Tσ′. σ = 0@T, σ′ ∧ Inv(κ, σ)
{P} genFor c {Q}
To avoid reasoning about memory updates as far as possible, we code in a style where all local context
is stored on the stack and manipulated using Dup and Swap. Although the resulting code is lengthy, it is
relatively easy to automate the corresponding proofs.
Stateful encoding of labels Changing the representation of tags from integers to pointers requires modi-
fying one small part of the basic system proof. Recall that in Section 6 we described the encoding of labels
into tags as a pure function Lab. To deal with the memory-dependent and non-canonical representation of
sets described above, the extended system instead uses a relation between an abstract label, a concrete tag
that encodes it, and a memory in which this tag should be interpreted.
If tags are pointers to data structures, it is crucial that these data structures remain intact as long as
the tags appear in the machine state. We guarantee this by maintaining the very strong invariant that each
execution of the fault handler only allocates new frames, and never modifies the contents of existing ones,
except for the cache frame (which tags never point into). A more realistic implementation might use
mutable kernel memory for other purposes and garbage collect unused tags; this would require a more
complicated memory invariant.
The TINI formulation is similar in essence to the one in Section 10, but some subtleties arise for con-
crete output events, since their tags cannot be interpreted on their own anymore. We wish to (i) keep the
semantics of the concrete machine independent of high-level policies such as IFC and (ii) give a statement
of noninterference that does not refer to pointers. To achieve these seemingly contradictory aims, we model
an event of the concrete machine as a pair of a concrete atom plus the whole state of the kernel memory.
This memory is not visible to observers in the formulation of TINI, but instead determines which events’
payloads they are able to observe. This is done by extending our notion of observation with a function that
interprets every concrete event present in the output trace in higher-level terms. This interpretation abstracts
away from low-level representation issues, such as the layout of data structures in memory, and allows us to
give a more natural definition of event indistinguishability in the formulation of TINI. For instance, in the
extended system described above, the interpretation of a pointer tag is the set of principals that that pointer
represents in kernel memory—that is, the contents of the array it points to. This allows us to define the
event indistinguishability relation by simple equality.
Our model of observation in terms of an interpretation function is an idealization of what happens in the
real SAFE machine, where communication of labeled data with the outside world involves cryptography.
Extending this model this is left as future work.
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12 Related Work
The SAFE design spans a number of research areas, and a comprehensive overview of related work would
be huge. We focus here on a small set of especially relevant points of comparison.
Language-based IFC Static approaches to IFC have generally dominated language-based security re-
search [69, 73, 77, 93]; however, statically enforcing IFC at the lowest level of a real system is chal-
lenging. Soundly analyzing native binaries with reasonable precision is hard (static IFC for low-level
code usually stops at the bytecode level [13, 38, 42, 59]), even more so without the compiler’s coop-
eration (e.g., for stripped or obfuscated binaries). Proof-carrying code [12, 13, 38] and typed assembly
language [61, 94, 95] have been used for enforcing IFC on low-level code without low-level analysis or
adding the compiler to the TCB. In SAFE [29, 34] we follow a different approach, enforcing noninterfer-
ence using purely dynamic checks, for arbitrary binaries in a custom-designed instruction set. The mech-
anisms we use for this are similar to those found in recent work on purely dynamic IFC for high-level
languages [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 40, 41, 44, 45, 63, 72, 75, 78, 83, 86]; however, as far as we know, we are the first
to push these ideas to the lowest level.
seL4 Murray et al. [66] recently demonstrated a machine-checked noninterference proof for the imple-
mentation of the seL4 microkernel. This proof is carried out by refinement and reuses the specification and
most of the existing functional correctness proof of seL4 [53]. Like the TINI property in this paper, the
variant of intransitive noninterference used by Murray et al. is preserved by refinement because it implies a
high degree of determinism [65]. This organization of their proof was responsible for a significant saving in
effort, even when factoring in the additional work required to remove all observable non-determinism from
the seL4 specification. Beyond these similarities, SAFE and seL4 rely on completely different mechanisms
to achieve different notions of noninterference (seL4 admits intransitive IFC policies, capturing the “where”
dimension of declassification [79], while we consider transitive ones). Whereas, in SAFE, each word of
data has an IFC label and labels are propagated on each instruction, the seL4 kernel maintains separation
between several large partitions (e.g., one partition can run an unmodified version of Linux) and ensures
that information is conveyed between such partitions only in accordance with a fixed access control policy.
PROSPER In parallel work, Dam et al. [27, 28, 52] verified information flow security for a tiny proof-
of-concept separation kernel running on ARMv7 and using a Memory Management Unit for physical pro-
tection of memory regions belonging to different partitions. The authors argue that noninterference is not
well suited for systems in which components are supposed to communicate with each other. Instead, they
use the bisimulation proof method to show trace equivalence between the real system and an ideal top-level
specification that is secure by construction. As in seL4 [66], the proof methodology precludes an abstract
treatment of scheduling, but the authors contend this is to be expected when information flow is to be taken
into account. In more recent work, Balliu et al. [10] propose a symbolic execution-based information flow
analysis for machine code, and use this technique to verify a separation kernel system call handler, a UART
device driver, and a crypto service modular exponentiation routine.
TIARA and ARIES The SAFE architecture embodies a number of innovations from earlier paper de-
signs. In particular, the TIARA design [84] first proposed the idea of a zero-kernel operating system and
sketched a concrete architecture, while the ARIES project proposed using a hardware rule cache to speed
up information-flow tracking [16]. In TIARA and ARIES, tags had a fixed set of fields and were of limited
length, whereas, in SAFE, tags are pointers to arbitrary data structures, allowing them to represent complex
IFC labels encoding sophisticated security policies [62], for instance decentralized ones [69, 85]. More-
over, unlike TIARA and ARIES, which made no formal soundness claims, SAFE proposes a set of IFC
rules aimed at achieving noninterference; the proof we present in this paper, though for a simplified model,
provides evidence that this goal is feasible.
RIFLE and other binary-rewriting-based IFC systems RIFLE [91] enforces user-specified information-
flow policies for x86 binaries using binary rewriting, static analysis, and augmented hardware. Binary
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rewriting is used to make implicit flows explicit; it heavily relies on static analysis for reconstructing the
program’s control-flow graph and performing reaching-definitions and alias analysis. The augmented hard-
ware architecture associates labels with registers and memory and updates these labels on each instruction
to track explicit flows. Additional security registers are used by the binary translation mechanism to help
track implicit flows. Beringer [14] recently proved (in Coq) that the main ideas in RIFLE can be used
to achieve noninterference for a simple While language. Unlike RIFLE, SAFE achieves noninterference
purely dynamically and does not rely on binary rewriting or heroic static analysis of binaries. Moreover,
the SAFE hardware is generic, simply caching instances of software-managed rules.
While many other information flow tracking systems based on binary rewriting have been proposed, few
are concerned with soundly handling implicit flows [23, 60], and even these do so only to the extent they
can statically analyze binaries. Since, unlike RIFLE (and SAFE), these systems use unmodified hardware,
the overhead for tracking implicit flows can be large. To reduce this overhead, recent systems track implicit
flows selectively [51] or not at all [49, 74]—arguably a reasonable tradeoff in settings such as malware
analysis or attack detection, where speed and precision are more important than soundness.
Hardware taint tracking The last decade has seen significant progress in specialized hardware for accel-
erating taint tracking [18, 25, 26, 31, 32, 89, 92]. Most commonly, a single tag bit is associated with each
word to specify if it is tainted or not. Initially aimed at mitigating low-level memory corruption attacks by
preventing the use of tainted pointers and the execution of tainted instructions [18, 25, 89], hardware-based
taint tracking has also been used to prevent high-level attacks such as SQL injection and cross-site script-
ing [26]. In contrast to SAFE, these systems prioritize efficiency and overall helpfulness over the soundness
of the analysis, striking a heuristic balance between false positives and false negatives (missed attacks). As
a consequence, these systems ignore implicit flows and often do not even track all explicit flows. While
early systems supported a single hard-coded taint propagation policy, recent ones allow the policy to be de-
fined in software [26, 31, 92] and support monitoring policies that go beyond taint tracking [19, 31, 32, 76].
Harmoni [31], for example, provides a pair of caches that are quite similar to the SAFE rule cache. Possibly
these could even be adapted to enforcing noninterference, in which case we expect the proof methodology
introduced here to apply.
Timing and termination Our TINI property ignores both termination and timing: a program that di-
verges, fails, or takes varying amounts of time to run based on a sensitive input is considered secure. The
full SAFE design includes a clearance-based access-control mechanism [86] for addressing termination and
timing covert channels (i.e., high-bandwidth channels through which malicious code can exfiltrate secrets
it directly has access to). Stefan et al. [87] have also shown that in a concurrent setting such leaks can
be prevented by an adapted IFC mechanism, at the risk of spawning very large numbers of threads. We
believe that this IFC mechanism could also be enforced using the hardware mechanisms we describe here.
A recently proposed technique for instruction-based scheduling [17, 88] is aimed at preventing leaks via
the internal timing side-channel (e.g., malicious code sharing the same processor inferring secrets through
timing variations arising from cache misses). This could probably be adapted to SAFE, and since the SAFE
processor is very simple the mitigation could work well [24]. Finally, several mechanisms have been pro-
posed for mitigating the external timing side-channel (i.e., leakage of secrets to an attacker making timing
observations over the network) and thus reducing the rate at which bits can be leaked [3, 98]. We do not
consider any of these attacks or mitigations in this work.
Verification of low-level code The distinctive challenge in verifying machine code is coping with un-
structured control flow. Our approach using structured generators to build the fault handler is similar to
the mechanisms used in Chlipala’s Bedrock system [20, 21] and by Jensen et al. [50], but there are several
points of difference. These systems each build macros on top of a powerful low-level program logic for ma-
chine code (Ni and Shao’s XCAP [71], in the case of Bedrock), whereas we take a simpler, ad-hoc approach,
building directly on our stack machine’s relatively high-level semantics. Both these systems are based on
separation logic, which we can do without since (at least in the present simplified model) we have very few
memory operations to reason about. We have instead focused on developing a simple Hoare logic specifi-
cally suited to verifying structured runtime-system code; e.g., we omit support for arbitrary code pointers,
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but add support for reasoning about termination. We use total-correctness Hoare triples (similar to Myreen
and Gordon [70]) and weakest preconditions to guarantee progress, not just safety, for our handler code.
Finally, our level of automation is much more modest than Bedrock’s, though still adequate to discharge
most verification conditions on straight-line stack manipulation code rapidly and often automatically.
Work on testing noninterference The abstract machine in Section 3 was proposed by Hrit¸cu et al. [46],
extended in this work with dynamic allocation and data classification (Section 11), and recently further
extended by Hrit¸cu et al. to a sophisticated machine featuring a highly permissive flow-sensitive dynamic
enforcement mechanism, public labels, and registers [47]. While the focus of that work is on verifying
noninterference by random testing, it also shows how to use invariants discovered during testing to formalize
proofs of noninterference in Coq.
Although the abstract machine and IFC mechanism considered here are simpler than the most complex
ones of Hrit¸cu et al. [47], our main concerns are the concrete machine, the IFC fault handler, and the
key properties of this combination, all of which are novel. We believe nevertheless that our methodology
could be extended to that setting as well, verifying an implementation of this extended IFC machine by
a lower-level one. Depending on the hardware capabilities at the lower level, some of the features of the
machine could have to be implemented in software, requiring further proofs. For instance, this extended
IFC machine still relies on a protected stack for soundly performing function calls and returns: on a call,
the entire register file is stored on this stack, so that it can be restored upon a return, thereby preventing data
leakage. At the lowest level, this protected stack could be implemented with a regular stack living in kernel
space, managed through special system calls.
Tagging hardware beyond IFC Although the tagging mechanism we discuss arose in the context of
the SAFE system, and was primarily designed for information-flow control, it is sufficiently generic to be
implemented in other architectures and to enforce more security policies.
In follow-on work, Dhawan et al. [35] adapt the tagging mechanism to a more conventional RISC pro-
cessor, using it to implement policies such as memory safety and control-flow integrity. They evaluate the
performance of the mechanism on benchmark simulations, which indicate a modest impact on speed (typi-
cally under 10%) and power ceiling (less that 10%), even when enforcing multiple policies simultaneously.
Azevedo de Amorim et al. [9] use Coq to formalize a generic version of the symbolic machine of Sec-
tion 4; that machine is different from the one discussed here in that it is based on a more conventional
processor design (e.g., with registers instead of a protected stack), and serves as a high-level substrate for
programming many different security policies, including compartmentalization and memory safety. Finally,
they formulate the intended effect of each policy as a security property, using formal proofs to show that
each policy enforces the corresponding property.
A recent project at Draper Labs [30] is working to extend the RISC-V processor with tag propagation
hardware in the style of the SAFE processor. As of March 2016, a prototype able to boot Linux is running
on FPGA boards.
13 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a formal model of the key IFC mechanisms of the SAFE system: propagating and check-
ing tags to enforce security, using a hardware cache for common-case efficiency and a software fault handler
for maximum flexibility. To formalize and prove properties at such a low level (including features such as
dynamic memory allocation and labels represented by pointers to in-memory data structures), we first con-
struct a high-level abstract specification of the system, then refine it in two steps into a realistic concrete
machine. A bidirectional refinement methodology allows us to prove (i) that the concrete machine, loaded
with the right fault handler (i.e. correctly implementing the IFC enforcement of the abstract specification)
satisfies a traditional notion of termination-insensitive noninterference, and (ii) that the concrete machine
reflects all the behaviors of the abstract specification. Our formalization reflects the programmability of the
fault handling mechanism, in that the fault handler code is compiled from a rule table written in a small
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DSL. We set up a custom Hoare logic to specify and verify the corresponding machine code, following the
structure of a simple compiler for this DSL.
The development in this paper concerns three deterministic machines and simplifies away concurrency.
While the lack of concurrency is a significant current limitation that we would like to remove by moving to a
multithreading single-core model, we still want to maintain the abstraction layers of a proof-by-refinement
architecture. This requires some care so as not to run afoul of the refinement paradox [48] since some stan-
dard notions of noninterference (for example possibilistic noninterference) are not preserved by refinement
in the presence of non-determinism. One promising path toward this objective is inspired by the recent
noninterference proof for seL4 [65, 66]. If we manage to share a common thread scheduler between the
abstract and concrete machines, we could still prove a strong double refinement property (concrete refines
abstract and vice versa) and hence preserve a strong notion of noninterference (such as the TINI notion
from this work) or a possibilistic variation.
Although this paper focuses on IFC and noninterference, the tagging facilities of the concrete machine
are completely generic and have been used since to enforce completely different properties like memory
safety, compartment isolation, and control-flow integrity [9]. Moreover, although the rule cache / fault han-
dler design arose in the context of SAFE, it has since been adapted to a conventional RISC processor [35].
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